Wednesday, August 18, 2010

U.S. air power in perspective


.
Certain bloggers and pundits are frequently quite alarmist about a decline of U.S. air power.


It's true that the inventory of aircraft is shrinking, in part (not only) because of rising costs of combat aircraft. The F-22 didn't even come close to early expectations for 750 fighters (187 for real). The F-35 is unlikely to exceed a 2,000 production run unless a major conventional war pushes unexpected funds into the program. The annual planned production of 80 F-35 for the USAF seems to be fiscally out of reach by at least a third (more like a half), for example.


An absolute decline / downsizing / shrinking / reduction isn't necessarily a reason for complaints, though. The waste of taxpayer money in an inefficient program - well, that's a good reason for critique. The anticipated production figures in themselves? Not necessarily.

Let's compare the expected U.S. air power of the late 2010's:
187 F-22
552 F/A-18 E/F
88 F/A-18G
??? F-35
(20 B-2)
(??? F-15 and F-16 multi-role models)
(all of them minus a few losses from accidents)

The overall sum of modern combat aircraft would be about 900-1,200 in the late 2010's (it depends on the F-35 program).


For comparison (again ignoring accidents):


Germany:

140-180 Typhoon
dozens of old Tornado (mostly a SEAD version, 70's airframe)


United Kingdom:

160-232 Typhoon
150 F-35B
(serious cuts & foreign sales of in-service aircraft are possible)


France:

180-224 Rafale
20 or more Mirage 2000-5F (70's airframe upgraded with 90's avionics)

Italy:
96 Typhoon
few Tornado (SEAD version) or F-35 instead

Spain:
87 Typhoon
(+possibly dozens early-model F/A-18 near their end of life)


Japan:

130 F-2
(+ old F-15J/DJ)


South Korea:

(132 KF-16C/D Block 52)
(60 F-15K)
(90's technology in 70's airframes)


PR China (plans are not really known):

200 or more J-10A/B
96 Su-30 (90's technology in a 70's airframe)
120 or more J-11 (A: obsolete copy of Su-27, B: same airframe, indigenous components)
??? J-15 (copy of a Su-27, -30 or -33 model ?)

India:
270 Su-30 (90's technology in a 70's airframe)
hoping for a few dozen of a total of 250 PAK-FA (Suchoi T-50)
45 MiG-29K
126 "MRCA" (gen 4.5 strike fighter competition)
(+ 46 Mirage 2000-5; 90's technology in 70's airframe)

Russia:
hoping for a few dozen of a total of 250 PAK-FA (Suchoi T-50)
28 Su-30 (90's technology in a 70's airframe)
36 Su-33
48 Su-34
48 Su-35S/BM
24 MiG-29K (90's technology in 70's airframe)
(up to 445 70's technology Su-27's)
(possibly still up to 245 Su-25 ground attack aircraft)
(286-386 MiG-31 strategic interceptors; no true front fighters)
(Russian air power in general; it's mostly a paper tiger air power
because of 12+ years of minimal training and funds)

It seems as if the U.S. air power was quite oversized - unless you compare it with Sweden, Israel, Bahrein, Katar or the UAE, small nations with disproportionately strong air forces based on either clever procurement, subsidies or crude oil wealth.

- - - - -

Keep in mind that the U.S. would in no reasonable scenario need to go to (air) war against a well-equipped air power without allies; the reasonable combinations are:

Conflicts in East Asia:
+ South Korea or
+ Japan or
+ both

Defensive wars in Europe and its periphery:
+ Germany, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy & smaller allies




The PAK-FA, J-10B and J-11B are the most interesting unknown variables for they could incorporate hidden innovations to counter the concepts of the F-22 and Super Hornet (both known since the 90's). Even such innovations wouldn't de-value their adversaries completely, though. It would more likely lead to a more even playing field or restrictions on mission profiles.


It's unlikely that the Russian and Chinese air forces will to be brothers in arms soon; the "Western" air superiority seems to be ensured (in the conventional understanding of air power).
The F-35 program can be allowed to shrink without classic air superiority (and even air supremacy) at risk, it seems.

- - - - -

I think that the political problem here isn't so much the comparison with potential adversaries, especially not with inclusion of possible allies.
The problem is the comparison of the future, present and past air force. The problem is that humans get used to things/conditions and bureaucracies resist against reductions.

The problem is that people are irrational and think of "air power! air power! air power!" instead of "air power as part of the efficient answer to actual national needs".
Costs are not seen as the counterpart to value in US. air power debates, but as a mere limiting factor for overall might.

Today's U.S. Navy is a greater air power than all foreign air forces. The same holds true for the USAF. Most other powerful air forces are either allied, friendly or neutral.
What exactly is so scary about a "smaller" air force? The lesser annual costs and the smaller urge to attack foreign countries?

One line of thought asserts that a certain mass advantage discourages potential challengers. A huge, huge USN or a huge, huge USAF would prevent that a another power would challenge them, ever.
Well, the proponents of this idea should probably have a look at the naval army race of 1898-1916 and the Dreadnought revolution. I also fail to see how NATO was prohibited from accepting an arms race with the militarised Soviet Union of the early Cold War with tis sick artillery and tank inventories.

In any case, it's difficult to make the point that the USAF needs to keep its numerical strength of the 90's with "5th generation" aircraft for strategic defence. Such a reasoning is even questionable if the purpose is strategic offence.


I as a German have greater confidence in allies if they focus on curing economic and fiscal woes to stabilise their pillars than it they continue a military procurement orgy on brittle pillars (and in part on foreign loans).
It's also quite important that the U.S. sticks to its obligation of the North Atlantic Treaty and doesn't launch wars of aggression, for these pin down military power and endanger allies. A "shrinking" USAF on the other hand is of no concern to me.

Sven Ortmann

edit 2010-08-20: I excluded deliberately many 1980's or low performance aircraft such as most Tornado IDS; non-upgraded Mirage 2000, the AMX, Japanese F-4s and obsolete Chinese models. These will either be cut till the end of the decade or be simply without relevance in regard to relative air power.
The old Su-27's could be ignored as well, for many of them are simply outdated (lacking competitive missiles and avionics for mdoern air combat, yet being useless for air/ground missions).
.

No comments:

Post a Comment