Showing posts with label Military Procurement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Military Procurement. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 31, 2010

Economist article: "Defence spending in a time of austerity"

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Yet another noteworthy article, this time a recent one:

"Defence spending in a time of austerity
The chronic problem of exorbitantly expensive weapons is becoming acute"

(The F-35 may still appear to stay below the trend,
but we'll see how that turns out in the next years.)
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Military procurement lessons (re)learned of the last decades

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The series of procurement disasters around the world is long and impressive. Projects lasted far to long (some lasted for three decades), busted their budget badly, produced mediocre or unsafe equipment, didn't meet the forces' real needs, were cancelled after high R&D costs or a combination of several such failures.

It's astonishing that the problem isn't under control, for the lessons were learned and could be implemented:

* No cost-plus contracts that motivate the supplier to bust the original budget.

* Neutral yet competent cost estimates are necessary because pro-program persons and institutions downplay (lie about)  the costs.

* No political decision to stretch a program, for this increases the cost more than lending money for a timely program execution.

* Program managers need be loyal to the taxpayer, not to their project.

* Program managers need to be held responsible for (lack of) performance.

* Research and development need to be separated to keep technology risks down and avoid costly delays.

* The armed service needs to have the (technical) competence to define what it needs.

* Do not force multiple armed services to agree on a "joint" product. At least don't let them believe that they might get a custom development just for their service if there was no joint project. This never works out well.

* Do not allow "upgrades" that come close to the cost of a new product.

* Do not stare at the modernity of the product at the beginning of its operational service. Look at the average modernity over its lifetime. It may be better to replace mediocre products more often than to buy one super product and stick with it for a decade after its obsolescence.

* Small development cost items should be developed with industry capital.

* Off-the shelf products very often meet or exceed the requirements and should be bought.

* The state must not become soft and grant waivers over the original contract (build a tough reputation by enforcing contracts).

* Good contracts and requirements coupled with a tough procurement stance on the same allow for a very lax project supervision that doesn't burden the supplier with paperwork.

* Development requirements creep needs to be mostly avoided, this can be pone by requiring very high-level agreement for every change of requirements during a development project.

* Block special interests.

* Do not develop a product if you need only small quantities and could buy something off the shelf.

* "Perfect is the enemy of good."

* Do not allow your supplier to treat you as a low-priority customer. The taxpayer's interests deserve above-average engineers and priority!

* Do not allow suppliers to misunderstand the defence budget for a subsidy pool.

* Do not develop a major product in cooperation with the French. They will bail out once it becomes irrefutable that the product won't be "100% Made in France".

* Punish low performance of bidders in previous contracts by giving contracts to their competition.

* Do not encourage industrial concentration in mega corporations.

* Break up mega corporations with a competition protection act or by pressuring them to disintegrate into cooperating yet fully independent companies by withholding contracts.

* Last 10% of performance causes 30% of the costs, so KISS (keep it simple, stupid).

* Early development phase fixates 80% of costs (total development, per unit), so get it right soon.

* Think in the long term. Don't muddle through all the time, dare to standardise ideal calibres and vehicle families even if that's in contrast with existing inventories.

* Don't launch a development project if the future availability of funds for full development and production is questionable.

* Do not combine an whole army reform program into a bundle of development projects. Launch a development project for the link instead (communication standard and hardware).

* Do not allow fashions to take over your R&D department. Chase the proponents of fashions that violate common sense out of the ministry.

* Quality is overemphasized in peacetime, quantity is essential in wartime. Do not allow designs that are not affordable in quantity.

* Do not overemphasize platforms over ammunitions, spare parts and training funds.

* Use clear and honest information when informing parliament and public, do not misguide and conceal with 6+ definitions of "cost" or other trickery.

* Avoid one-trick ponies. Versatility is a value in itself.

* Demand and enforce that all public servants and soldiers involved in research or development or procurement projects sign a commitment with a huge contract penalty that keeps them from working directly or indirectly for the industry. Relieve those who reject it.

* Agree with the major opposition party if you're about to launch a development  & procurement project that is despite observing all these rules still expected to last longer than your government coalition.

I wrote this list in 30 minutes without dedicated research, just out of my memory. The lessons learned are really obvious. There are only two explanations for why military procurement efforts are still so often a mess: Incompetence and evil.
It looks to me as if politicians don't do their job, followed by lower ranks mixing incompetence, red tape caused by incompetence and inappropriate interests into the problem.


Any reform needs to be a top-down effort. It's therefore appropriate to hold politicians (especially minister of defence and his highest tier secretaries) responsible for every failure that began when they were in office. Such gross failures should haunt them even after their continued their political career in opposition or another office.


Sven Ortmann
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Wednesday, August 18, 2010

U.S. air power in perspective


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Certain bloggers and pundits are frequently quite alarmist about a decline of U.S. air power.


It's true that the inventory of aircraft is shrinking, in part (not only) because of rising costs of combat aircraft. The F-22 didn't even come close to early expectations for 750 fighters (187 for real). The F-35 is unlikely to exceed a 2,000 production run unless a major conventional war pushes unexpected funds into the program. The annual planned production of 80 F-35 for the USAF seems to be fiscally out of reach by at least a third (more like a half), for example.


An absolute decline / downsizing / shrinking / reduction isn't necessarily a reason for complaints, though. The waste of taxpayer money in an inefficient program - well, that's a good reason for critique. The anticipated production figures in themselves? Not necessarily.

Let's compare the expected U.S. air power of the late 2010's:
187 F-22
552 F/A-18 E/F
88 F/A-18G
??? F-35
(20 B-2)
(??? F-15 and F-16 multi-role models)
(all of them minus a few losses from accidents)

The overall sum of modern combat aircraft would be about 900-1,200 in the late 2010's (it depends on the F-35 program).


For comparison (again ignoring accidents):


Germany:

140-180 Typhoon
dozens of old Tornado (mostly a SEAD version, 70's airframe)


United Kingdom:

160-232 Typhoon
150 F-35B
(serious cuts & foreign sales of in-service aircraft are possible)


France:

180-224 Rafale
20 or more Mirage 2000-5F (70's airframe upgraded with 90's avionics)

Italy:
96 Typhoon
few Tornado (SEAD version) or F-35 instead

Spain:
87 Typhoon
(+possibly dozens early-model F/A-18 near their end of life)


Japan:

130 F-2
(+ old F-15J/DJ)


South Korea:

(132 KF-16C/D Block 52)
(60 F-15K)
(90's technology in 70's airframes)


PR China (plans are not really known):

200 or more J-10A/B
96 Su-30 (90's technology in a 70's airframe)
120 or more J-11 (A: obsolete copy of Su-27, B: same airframe, indigenous components)
??? J-15 (copy of a Su-27, -30 or -33 model ?)

India:
270 Su-30 (90's technology in a 70's airframe)
hoping for a few dozen of a total of 250 PAK-FA (Suchoi T-50)
45 MiG-29K
126 "MRCA" (gen 4.5 strike fighter competition)
(+ 46 Mirage 2000-5; 90's technology in 70's airframe)

Russia:
hoping for a few dozen of a total of 250 PAK-FA (Suchoi T-50)
28 Su-30 (90's technology in a 70's airframe)
36 Su-33
48 Su-34
48 Su-35S/BM
24 MiG-29K (90's technology in 70's airframe)
(up to 445 70's technology Su-27's)
(possibly still up to 245 Su-25 ground attack aircraft)
(286-386 MiG-31 strategic interceptors; no true front fighters)
(Russian air power in general; it's mostly a paper tiger air power
because of 12+ years of minimal training and funds)

It seems as if the U.S. air power was quite oversized - unless you compare it with Sweden, Israel, Bahrein, Katar or the UAE, small nations with disproportionately strong air forces based on either clever procurement, subsidies or crude oil wealth.

- - - - -

Keep in mind that the U.S. would in no reasonable scenario need to go to (air) war against a well-equipped air power without allies; the reasonable combinations are:

Conflicts in East Asia:
+ South Korea or
+ Japan or
+ both

Defensive wars in Europe and its periphery:
+ Germany, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy & smaller allies




The PAK-FA, J-10B and J-11B are the most interesting unknown variables for they could incorporate hidden innovations to counter the concepts of the F-22 and Super Hornet (both known since the 90's). Even such innovations wouldn't de-value their adversaries completely, though. It would more likely lead to a more even playing field or restrictions on mission profiles.


It's unlikely that the Russian and Chinese air forces will to be brothers in arms soon; the "Western" air superiority seems to be ensured (in the conventional understanding of air power).
The F-35 program can be allowed to shrink without classic air superiority (and even air supremacy) at risk, it seems.

- - - - -

I think that the political problem here isn't so much the comparison with potential adversaries, especially not with inclusion of possible allies.
The problem is the comparison of the future, present and past air force. The problem is that humans get used to things/conditions and bureaucracies resist against reductions.

The problem is that people are irrational and think of "air power! air power! air power!" instead of "air power as part of the efficient answer to actual national needs".
Costs are not seen as the counterpart to value in US. air power debates, but as a mere limiting factor for overall might.

Today's U.S. Navy is a greater air power than all foreign air forces. The same holds true for the USAF. Most other powerful air forces are either allied, friendly or neutral.
What exactly is so scary about a "smaller" air force? The lesser annual costs and the smaller urge to attack foreign countries?

One line of thought asserts that a certain mass advantage discourages potential challengers. A huge, huge USN or a huge, huge USAF would prevent that a another power would challenge them, ever.
Well, the proponents of this idea should probably have a look at the naval army race of 1898-1916 and the Dreadnought revolution. I also fail to see how NATO was prohibited from accepting an arms race with the militarised Soviet Union of the early Cold War with tis sick artillery and tank inventories.

In any case, it's difficult to make the point that the USAF needs to keep its numerical strength of the 90's with "5th generation" aircraft for strategic defence. Such a reasoning is even questionable if the purpose is strategic offence.


I as a German have greater confidence in allies if they focus on curing economic and fiscal woes to stabilise their pillars than it they continue a military procurement orgy on brittle pillars (and in part on foreign loans).
It's also quite important that the U.S. sticks to its obligation of the North Atlantic Treaty and doesn't launch wars of aggression, for these pin down military power and endanger allies. A "shrinking" USAF on the other hand is of no concern to me.

Sven Ortmann

edit 2010-08-20: I excluded deliberately many 1980's or low performance aircraft such as most Tornado IDS; non-upgraded Mirage 2000, the AMX, Japanese F-4s and obsolete Chinese models. These will either be cut till the end of the decade or be simply without relevance in regard to relative air power.
The old Su-27's could be ignored as well, for many of them are simply outdated (lacking competitive missiles and avionics for mdoern air combat, yet being useless for air/ground missions).
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Saturday, August 14, 2010

"We need to retain the industrial competence and capacity"

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It is very common to claim that this or that armed service needs to buy x or y simply because the specialised industrial capacities would otherwise break away, with a terrible loss of industrial competence. This is often an argument behind portions of military budgets that remind rather of industry subsidies than actual military procurement, such as the third buy of a ridiculously overpriced EGV (Einsatzgruppenversorger, fleet supply ship) for the German navy.


Several facts irritate me in this regard:

(I)
Many suppliers may have some competence, but often times their corporate culture is so rotten and wasteful that creative destruction might be worth it. Shipyards and generally arms industries with a reputation for producing overpriced products are prime suspects.

(II)
Nobody can prove that civilian industries are unable to convert to military products in a matter of a few years. Actually, the World War experiences suggest the opposite.

(III)
Maybe it takes technical expertise at the procurement agency to retain the necessary competence, not in the industry? Civilian industries are used to produce according to their customer's specifications. The ability to specify what you want is probably the key, not keeping an industry used to your specifications.

(IV)

Historical examples. The French aviation industry got many small orders throughout the 20's and 30's from the Armée de l'air, but it was worse than the German one by about 1938 (there had been almost no German aviation industry during the 20's!).
The French were late to convert from old airframe technologies to all-metal airframes, did not innovate much and their production capacity was rated as manual and unsuitable for quantity production by foreign visitors.

(V)
Lobbyism. There's a systematic bias in favour of the status quo industries not only because of widespread intellectual laziness and risk aversion, but also because said existing industries can spend on lobbyism. Not-yet-existing suppliers cannot do the same.

(VI)
Large, modern procurement projects last for so long and are so expensive that it's difficult to imagine that civilian companies which survived the fierce competition in civilian markets and met the requirements of civilian customers with projects lengths like one to six years could perform worse.
The only good explanation for such a scenario seems to be the A400M pattern; a civilian industry might misunderstand a military development & procurement contract for a subsidy.



I wished that this "we need to retain the industrial competence and capacity" argument would be taken with a grain of salt, not as gospel. It really doesn't deserve to be treated as "black box" argument that requires no further inquiry. It's likely more often than not a very, very poor argument.


Sven Ortmann

edit 2010-08-20: Changed 1936 to 1938.
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Saturday, July 31, 2010

Another voice for ground/ground air force missiles

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(context was a possible F-35 purchase):

If we continue to use the very advanced [versions of the] F-16 and F-15 and upgrade some of the systems, we could save so much money that we could buy other important systems like ground-based missiles. And you can use more [air-launched] standoff weapons because they have extreme precision and a very long effective range. You don't have to put all your effort into the aircraft.
(my emphasis)

2010/07/18 Defence and Freedom:

Friday, July 30, 2010

On infantry small unit development

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(First a disclaimer: I'm going to write about warfare with opponents who have corrected vision, comparable combat morale and who can aim.)


Some authors claim that a German infantry squad of WW2 typically had 80% of its firepower concentrated in its one machine gun; a MG34 or MG42.
That was probably quite correct, but the carried ammunition and practical rate of fire indicate a slight exaggeration.
The issue was more fundamental than simple mechanical or material statistics, though. A machine gunner has the feeling that he can actually achieve much in battle and has typically a different psychology in effect than most other soldiers have.


Infantry is not all the same - you cannot give a special weapon to just anyone and expect always the same results. Differences are also deeper than mere qualifications and physical fitness or strength.

Some soldiers are aggressive, many are capable if lead well and some are basically porters, not fighters. The most basic problem for infantry is therefore to identify who belongs to which group and to assign jobs and missions accordingly (and possibly reject the porter guys).
The aggressive, daring guys who are very difficult to suppress need to become leaders (the smart ones) or operators for the most important weapons (such as a machine gun).


A 80/20 or 70/30 rule of thumb fits to many forms of human activity: 20-30% of the people have 80-70% of the overall effect (Pareto Principle). This is applicable to the spreading of diseases, the work in staffs, the kills of World War fighter pilots, the number of friends on social networking sites, the performance of snipers, the performance of computer gamers, the success in flirting and it's also relevant for infantry combat.
We can dream on in fantasy land and look at a platoon as a small unit of 20-50 equal men, but that's not going to be confirmed in intense combat.

- - - - -

OK, let's say we succeed to assign the most valuable men to the leadership jobs or give them the most powerful weapons. What does this tell us about the others in the platoon or squad?

The readers may not like it, but to be honest; the average assault rifle user will be little more than an ammunition porter for the main weapons and a rear/flank security man and message relay.

How does this fit to the everyone-a-super-soldier approach of modern Western infantry equipment programs? The average assault rifle user has got some heavy AT weapon, a designated marksman rifle or an underbarrel grenade launcher nowadays. He's so overloaded with his own kit that carrying additional ammunition for a machine gunner or a platoon commando mortar reduces the mobility to that of a four-year old.

The technology-driven approach with a flair of combined arms (accurate single shots, full auto suppressive fires, high trajectory HE projection) down to squad or even fire team level may be a terrible misunderstanding.

To equip everyone with better rifle optics than were available to WW2 snipers isn't going to turn everyone into a super soldier either. The sights may be worth their weight and bulk, but they don't turn cowards or extremely frightened and shaking men into cold-blooded fighters with an overwhelming lethality in a 400 m radius.
Such equipment will still have the greatest effect with the few men who are psychologically best prepared for combat (this may include being simply too dumb or crazy to understand the danger - in fact, smart people rarely turn out to be among the most daring).


It's probably about time that the psychological differences between infantrymen again consciously influence the setup of infantry small units. This ranges from personnel selection over equipment to tactics and TO&Es (tables of organisation and equipment).

Combat in complex, though. It may be a good idea to 'waste' some good weapons on not very good soldiers in order to distract hostiles, to relieve the few over-performers off (suppressive fires) pressure.


Next, we should keep in mind another pressing challenge: The extreme lethality of modern weapons. Forget about the experiences against unskilled paramilitary (or lesser) fighters in recent warfare. The extreme lethality of modern infantry battalion arsenals (up to 120 mm mortars) restricts the infantry small unit repertoire for most actions. Only very high pay-off actions justify very risky tactics. Most often infantry needs to be very cautious in order to preserve itself for important actions (the military view) and a life after the war (the individual's view).

The combination of high lethality and cautious behaviour leads quite naturally to very short yet intense fire fights with (whenever possible) the advantage of surprise, followed by a quick withdrawal and rallying. The latter is necessary in order to avoid being stuck (and fixed) in a protracted fire fight till hostile mortars end it.

This justifies an emphasis on the right weapons (and munitions) for such an action. A salvo of M72 or SARPAC-like weapons, a very high rate of fire for the machine gun (with an appropriate, stable tripod) and the use of command-detonated mines (~Claymores) are possible answers.

Another approach might emphasize stealth and the avoidance of breaking said stealth. A minimised muzzle fire thanks to suppressors and optimised flash hiders, barrel lengths and cartridges as well as the employment of deception tools (fake muzzle fires) are imaginable.

There's also the possibility that both the own and the hostile infantry are very cautious and often stumble into each other at short range. That could be avoided with detached scout pairs and the use of military dogs, but it's still a possibility. Devastating and immediate fires would be important in this case. Hand grenades might become more important in such situations than all electronics combined and independent (re)actions of all soldiers without much leadership would become most important.

Other patterns for dominant forms of infantry combat are imaginable and need to be considered. Every such form might lead to distinct preferences that could shape the ideal infantry small unit TO&E.


Another hugely important factor in 'real', wars of necessity (if not even total wars) is attrition.

Life expectancy drops to very, very sad levels once a man becomes an infantry lieutenant in wartime. It doesn't look substantially better for infantry NCOs.
A serious army needs to be prepared for appalling losses among its leadership. One way to prepare is to have more leaders than necessary (the U.S. way), another one is to overqualify their subordinates (the old German way).
As far as I can tell, the latter is superior because it enables a very quick adaption once losses happen. A decapitated platoon can continue its mission if an NCO takes the lead, while it would need to wait a while till a replacement leader arrives (and that guy would be unknown to the soldiers).
Some of the most effective and consequential small unit actions in military history have been completed by subordinates who took over command after the initial leaders fell.

This is quite a challenge for TO&Es, for you need enough well-suited men for leading, for employment of the main weapons AND as 2nd or 3rd in command. You don't want to rely on your best machine gunner as emergency platoon leader - that would equal a terrible loss of firepower. The 2nd in command should on the one hand not be too close to the 1st in command, but on the other hand you don't want him too far away. For example, he shouldn't be in the assault element if your army's tactic prefers the platoon leader to be with the fire support element.


Psychological capability in combat, the expected nature of infantry combat and attrition should influence our infantry small unit concepts much more than they seemingly did after the Cold War. Gadget-driven concepts of infantry combat and infantry small unit TO&Es have dominated for about 15 years and are still in fashion. This exaggeration needs to be corrected.

Again, it was impossible to cover the topic comprehensively. I limited myself to mention a few rather rarely discussed aspects of infantry small units setups. Maybe I ruined all the future fun of discussing gun calibres and 40mm underbarrel grenade weapons for you, but that's within the limits of the usual risks of reading this blog...


Sven Ortmann
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Ridiculous

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This is BAe's idea for a GCV: A ridiculous antenna farm.

This is how vehicles look when they're overloaded with gadgets after their third upgrade. A vehicle in CAD stage shouldn't look fucked up already.

Maybe they should think about this project more like a soldier and taxpayer, less like an electronics engineer.
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Friday, July 23, 2010

Helicopters & mobilisation

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There's a most important difference between small and great wars, and it's trivial: The scope.

You can pour high-end equipment and well-trained personnel into a small war, but that's not sustainable in a great war.
Great wars have the nasty habit of requiring as much resources as are available, and this includes mediocre and inferior resources. The cream alone doesn't suffice in great wars.

A military institution in Europe should first and foremost prepare for great wars. It doesn't need to be really ready for one, but it should at the very least be prepared to get ready a.s.a.p. once that becomes necessary.

Now there's a Cold War left-over that's quite strange. The Cold War demanded permanent readiness in Europe, and the WW3 scenarios left little to no time mobilisation. We partially ditched the idea of harnessing reserves and civilian assets for warfare based on these scenarios - especially in the former alliance frontier state of Germany (both). We had mobilisation plans, but their scope was laughable in comparison to the mobilisations of 1914/15 and 1939/40.


Today we're in the strange situation that our great war preparations - having lost much of our attention to stupid overseas adventures - don't seem to harness the reserves and civilians better than during the Cold War although we're now in a relative geographical position that would allow for a mobilisation in the event of war. Said mobilisation would probably not be decisive because it would take months, but it has at least become a possibility.



Let's take the recently covered helicopter topic as an example. We have approx. these German military helicopter inventories projected for 2015 (excluding naval helicopters, including orders):

82 CH-53 medium/heavy lift helicopters
122 NH90 TTH transport helicopters (more planned)
80 Tiger attack helicopter
100 Bo 105P1M light helicopter (liaison)
14 EC 135 light helicopter (training)
(Many additional old Bo 105 would probably be left in a cannibalized shape.)

Meanwhile, we have a civilian inventory of
789 helicopters in Germany, among them

119 R44
111 EC 135
52 MBB Bk 117
51 AS 355
43 Bell 206
32 Bo 105
26 EC 120
24 Hughes 369
18 AS 332
18 EC 135
15 A 109
12 Bell 407
10 Bell 212
9 MD-900
7 AB 412 / Bell 412
7 AB 204 / Bell 205
7 SA 330
6 S-76
6 SA 365


This includes few helicopters suitable for troops & material transport. The overwhelming majority of them would be suitable for liaison, MedEvac and observation (such as march route overwatch) purposes. I left away most very light helicopters such as two-seaters, as these would only be suitable for basic pilot training.


I think it would be a good idea to not only think of the common MilSpec helicopters as possible military helicopters. We could and most likely would commandeer civilian helicopters and the related personnel into service in the event of a great war.
These helicopters would most likely provide much of the liaison, medical transport and even some troop & cargo transport capacity.

This leads to the possible conclusion that there's no great need for liaison helicopters in the peacetime military; we would easily have enough of them with civilian registration. The MedEvac and liaison capacities would rest greatly on civilian types and this should influence force structure and especially our expectations. It makes no sense to develop and procure a handful of gold-plated MedEvac helicopters if we would have a 90% civilian medevac fleet in war, for example. Well, unless you are a fan of stupid small wars.


Sven Ortmann


Data on civilian helicopters: Thanks to LBA (Luftfahrtbundesamt).
Photo copyrights "Igge" (NH90) and "Stahlkocher" (EC135); Wikipedia users.
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Sunday, July 18, 2010

The first week of a peer vs. peer air war; a dilemma

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It's been a classic dilemma of the Cold War: What should be done early on in an air war?

* Should the air forces focus on the air superiority fight (fighter vs. fighter) at first?
* Should they focus on the destruction of enemy air defences first?
* Maybe attack enemy airfields?
* Maybe blow up some important bridges?
* Attacks on hostile troops on road marches?
* Attacks on hostile troops in contact with friendly troops?
* Should squadrons relocate to more survivable airfields or stay at their home airbases?
* What kind of mix would be optimal?

The Israelis had this kind of dilemma - especially in the surprising Yom Kippur War 1973. They seem to have improvised. The substantial losses of their attack aircraft forced a campaign against hostile battlefield air defences on them in the midst of the conflict. In the end, lots of technological changes and special conditions prevent the Yom Kippur example from giving us reliable guidance about how to answer the dilemma.

The dilemma wasn't nearly as serious in the conflict against Iraq. The Iraq was simply no peer and not capable of immediate decisive action on the ground or air. Fighting against Iraqis was even less than a sparring match in comparison to WW3 expectations. Again, there's little to learn from the campaigns against Iraqi forces in regard to the basic prioritization dilemma.

- - - - -

There might be an answer to the dilemma, though: Surprisingly, this may be a technological answer (and we should be sceptical about it for this reason).

It's obvious that several of the aforementioned options are related to the survivability of combat aircraft. Survivability against hostile fighters, against hostile attack aircraft (when on the ground) and against hostile air defences.

Now what if we were able to take this out of the equation? Let's assume we had a silver bullet that can strike operational level targets (typically 50-500 km depth, for example) while the artillery can strike close targets (and substitute for lacking close air support).
The air forces would then be able to fight for air war superiority, fight air force vs. air force. They would have the best probability of success, could later turn on the hostile ground forces and deliver a strong argument for the politicians who hopefully keep negotiating about an end of the folly.

OK, which weapon or munition could render fighters, air defences and attacks on friendly airfields quite irrelevant? The (quasi-) ballistic missile!

Such missiles are very survivable against most air defence systems, have a useful range for the operational level of war (the longer the range the faster - and thus more survivable!) and nowadays such missiles have the necessary pinpoint accuracy for the destruction of stationary (fixed and reconnoitered semi-mobile) targets: Air fields, long-range air defence batteries, bridges).

NATO air forces (and navies) have understood their potential, their potency as threat - and accordingly spent a great deal of attention and money on hard kill defences against such missiles.

They did not embrace the (quasi-)ballistic missile themselves, though. Missile types with less than 500 km range would fit into the treaties that are in force (except possibly ICOC 3-3).

It may be a prejudice, but maybe it's simply bureaucratic inertia coupled with conservativeness and special interests (fighter pilot generals wanting more fighter wings, not more unsexy missile batteries) that keeps these missiles outside of NATO air forces.
Foreign policy strategy (promotion of ICOC & BM counter-proliferation efforts in general) might play a role as well.

The exposure to Third World ballistic missiles based on Russian 1950's technology has distorted the perception of the (quasi-)ballistic missile threat. Such missiles are at times interpreted as useful only with non-conventional warheads.
It's almost forgotten that NATO had such battlefield missiles with conventional warheads in service during the Cold War!

- - - - -

There are several modern designs of accurate (quasi-)ballistic missiles:

supposedly 300 k range

supposedly 400 km range.

Supposedly 300 km range.
The payload is several hundred kilograms each - enough.

The most obvious choice for NATO forces would probably be to introduce (more) ATACMS Block II into Corps- or Division-level army artillery units and to produce in license a longer-range version of LORA (to be honest, its's most likely cheaper to let them develop a LORA 2 and to buy a license than to develop a missile of our own!).

The dilemma could then be solved quite easily; NATO air forces could alternate between defensive (defence with fighters and air defences) and offensive (additional strike packages against battlefield air defences and relatively easily accessible installations) phases until it has a won the air power vs. air power contest in one shape or another.
Strike missions against airfields, fixed and semi-mobile area air defence assets, bridges and the like (ministries?) would be substituted for with the fires from 300-500 km (quasi-)ballistic missile regiments.
Close air support could early on be substituted for with army aviation and artillery fires.


So far, the Western air forces don't seem to believe that this is necessary, though. They prefer air-launched cruise missiles of about 250-300 km range instead. Such cruise missiles require sorties just as the classic strike packages would do.


Maybe we should pay more attention to (quasi-)ballistic missiles as a gap in our air forces instead of paying obedient attention to other big ticket projects (fighters, bombers, air launched cruise missiles) and to the role of ballistic missiles as threats only.
F-35 and Typhoon critics are numerous - how many critical remarks about the lack of SRBMs in Western air forces did you see (except here)?

Sven Ortmann
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Wednesday, June 16, 2010

Times have changed

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Back in 2001, many people got crazy. Military forces were used for policy and additional funds were made available for them. The U.S. armed services were almost buried under the amount of money that flowed into their budget.

Back in 2007, the beginning economic crisis and soon shrinking Iraq invovlement should have led to an end of the money flood, back to normal. This didn't happen, first due to normal lags and later ebcause fiscal austerity was damned as economic suicide by a grassroots wannabe economic experts movement that took over the mainstream media in most Western nations in a few weeks last year.

The time of economic "stimulus package" (or "we cannot do much of use, but we can pretend to save the world by spending!") politics seems to be over now, and finally, things go back to normal. Well, there's at least a trend in that direction.

The published attitudes seem to have moved during the past few weeks. Maybe it was the impression that Greece left on us. Maybe the time was simply right: Cutting military budgets in order to cure the budget disasters has become a real topic, and an accepted one.

The German Einzelplan 14 budget will probably be cut by about a billion Euros per year, but that's peanuts in comparison to the expected cuts in the UK, Greece and U.S.. Even Spain and Italy might easily exceed that sum.

The strange thing about this is that military spending should be about external factors (such as threats), not about internal ones. Save for procurement activities of lasting effect; doesn't the ability to cut military budgets due to fiscal problems kind of prove that we spent too much before?

Sven Ortmann
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Friday, May 14, 2010

Defence policy thoughts for (very) small powers

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An acquaintance suggested that I write about the defence of a small country facing a less than very friendly, much larger neighbour.

Most texts here were written because of a spontaneous idea of mine (that may have been old at the time of writing, though). I'm not sure how good a "by request" text may be, but I'll give it a try.

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The first idea is to obviously avoid conflict. The small nation should not only avoid violent conflict; it should also avoid political conflict, maybe even ally with the larger power.
Regrettably, this option is not available in his (Estonian) case.

To seek other, sufficiently powerful, allies is another option. Sadly, even a written alliance treaty may ultimately fail to deter. Nevertheless, such a treaty pretty much ends the political challenge.

Next, the small nation should decide what form of armed resistance it wants to be able to put up. It signed an alliance treaty, after all - and that's a two-way commitment unlike a unilateral guarantee of sovereignty. This means also that even a small ally is supposed to be ready to help others. The minimum commitment would in my opinion be a readiness to deploy rear security troops and troops for handling prisoners of war.

Next, let's think about the military defence strategy and the suitable force structure.
There's a "miniature military" trap; some small armed forces attempt to mimic large ones, with a full set of capabilities ranging from simple infantry to heavy artillery, armoured forces, multi-role fighters, air defences and naval forces.
Israel is probably the only example that really worked well. Many militaries that adopt such a course fail and cannot reach good quality and readiness.

A tailored approach to national defence - coupled with some thought about the potential contribution to alliance defence elsewhere - looks more promising.
The defence of a very small alliance member against a much superior potential invader is quite a challenge without very suitable terrain and without forward deployed allied forces.

The first problem is the budget. Both its likely small size and the necessity of very efficient spending pose some tough challenges. Compromises are necessary - even compromises that say "no" to certain standard capabilities of bigger militaries.
Cost-efficiency is extremely important and this forces the usage of older and used equipment for most purposes. Only very, very influential key equipment can justify high procurement and operating costs.
Examples of such key equipment could be encrypting jam-resisting radios, capable anti-tank missiles, (very) short range air defence systems and possibly also equipment that's necessary for key actions. The latter could for example be some equipment for the destruction of the tunnel that connects South Ossetia with Russia (in the case of Georgia).

The defence of a given area against numerically superior invaders is a tough job. It's especially tricky if no continuous front line can be established for a lack of forces. Even a fortified front line wouldn't hold indefinitely, though. An army needs no overall numerical superiority in order to achieve a local 3:1 or 6:1 superiority. A breakthrough attempt with such a local superiority tends to lead to mobile warfare (just as the case without a continuous front line).


Success in mechanised mobile warfare requires skills and equipment that's unlikely to be found in small armies. There's nevertheless a temptation to add an armour battalion, regiment or brigade to the army.

The biggest advantage of doing so is probably the training effect for those who're supposed to resist enemy armour.

What could an armour brigade be worth? It adds primarily some offensive striking power, gives some headaches to invasion planners.

Those invasion planners would have much more severe headaches in other scenario planning, though. A single armour Bde isn't exactly a large force even by modern standards. NATO has dozens and even Germany's shrunk army has five active armour and mechanised brigades.

The failure of such a expensive and high profile component of the defender's arm would furthermore risk to break all defenders' morale.

It's reasonable to expect that the potential invader will prepare properly and have at least one very good answer for every obvious challenge.
The not-so-obvious, unpredicted obstacles would have less political deterrence value (not that this would make a difference when you're already allied with great powers), but they would cause unanticipated problems for an invader. It would be a good idea to strengthen the defence with something that poses an unmitigated challenge to the invader. Strengths that he doesn't know about, doesn't understand, cannot counter due to his own restrictions or doesn't want to counter due to arrogance might work.

Let's face it; main battle tanks are the last thing that an invader is not prepared to defeat. The necessary air defences alone could furthermore easily double the costs of the tank force.

Air and naval forces are often a waste of budget money as well. A fighter squadron or fighter wing would not stop an invasion. It might be crushed or stuck in its own base - or be defeated by superior air power in the air. Taiwan's air force gets a good share of their national defence budget, but its position is quite hopeless against the only realistic threat, the mainland Chinese air force.
Navies - well, let's recall the utterly irrelevant role played by the Polish navy in September of 1939. Navies are sometimes mere toy ship collections. Some nations really should limit themselves to simply blocking their harbours with some demolition experts in order to prevent their usage by the enemy.

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A quite fine example of a successful defence against a powerful neighbour is the Vietnamese defence against the Red Chinese punitive invasion in 1979. Vietnam - then unified only for a few years - had decided to put an end to the excesses and border violations of the crazy Red Khmer and sent its field army into Cambodia. The PR China was not amused and invaded Vietnam. This invasion got stuck quickly even though it faced only second-rate defence forces.


Invasión de China sobre Vietnam, 1978 - 1979
(Fuente: Nam, Crónica de la guerra de Vietnam)

The Vietnamese did not use high-tech tools, expensive weapons, much ammunition and as far as I know they did not desperately open dams to flood the terrain.
They had instead a kind of militia defence with many local defence networks (including underground networks) and a partially war-experienced light infantry force. The Chinese army on the other hand stumbled in part because of incompetence and previously unknown training deficiencies.
I don't want to suppose that this kind of defence would work in many or most cases world-wide, of course.

Well, I'm not exactly an expert on this particular conflict, but I'd suggest to small army planners to look more closely at it.

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It could also make sense to look at the bigger picture. I consider Estonia to be indefensible against a Russian invasion if the latter is well-prepared. Russia would most likely not want to annex only Estonia, though. A complete grab of the three Baltic countries is a more likely scenario. Estonian defence planners could therefore ask themselves how to spoil such a bigger invasion instead of a small invasion of only their country. (No matter how unlikely the scenarios are; preparing is what they get paid for, after all.)


larger map

Time would be a critical component of any such invasion plan. They would need to create a strong signal that discourages invasion planners by indicating that a quick invasion is too difficult.
This might lead to consider the defence of the Southern neighbour and ally Latvia instead of the own defence. This may sound strange, but waging a war abroad instead of at home does make sense. The French learned this thoroughly during the first World War.
An Estonian readiness to defend Riga (the Latvian capital and traffic node) could improve its own national security more than greater efforts to secure its own border and capital. Just food for thought.

The speed of an invasion could also be hampered by small and large landscape-shaping and infrastructure projects. The terrain can be shaped to be more of a problem to an invader (although trees grow slowly, for example) and the road network could be modified to be more easily blocked along possible invasion routes.
Settlement projects could be located with the creation of defensible closed terrain along invasion routes in mind.

Intra-alliance politics could also be important. NATO could invest in much better road connections between the Baltic states and Poland (to enable a quicker reinforcement and thus cut the invader's time table even more).
The richer, bigger allies could also subsidise Baltic armies in order to create army strengths way beyond the capability of the small countries themselves. That's certainly cheaper than forward deployment of allied brigades.


I do usually prefer to think about peer, 1-on-1 conflicts because these provide the kind of ceteris paribus scenario that allows for rather clear thinking about how to gain advantages purely by military skill.
Nevertheless, the defence policy problems of small alliance partners or even non-allied, isolated countries offer much food for thought as well. It's a much more refreshing case than the budget-busting high technology orgy fantasies that often pass as military thought in the Western World.

There's the case of indefensible nations, though. These nations depend on others and no military skill will ever change that.

Sven Ortmann
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Wednesday, April 21, 2010

The military spending free riding discussion

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There's again a public discussion about whether allies of the U.S. have a free ride on its military spending. Many comments and contributions in this discussion are charged with faulty logic, ignorance, disinformation, prejudices, domestic partisanship or emotions.

One example of this discussion is here.

Bigger graphic file here. Hat tip to P.a.p.-Blog.


I think the "answers" in this decades-old discussion can be grouped like this:

(1) Yes, they do. They should spend more.
(2) Yes, they do. The U.S. should spend less.
(3) Yes, they do. It's what the U.S. wants; be ahead of all other's military capabilities.
(4) No, they don't. It's no free ride if you pay billions as well.
(5) The greater U.S. expenses are due to its need for greater logistical and forced entry capabilities.
(6) No, the Europeans don't, for there's no problematic threat to them in sight.
(7) It depends. About which ally are we speaking?


Now I'd like to comment on these generic answers:

(1) Yes, they do. They should spend more.
What for should Germany spend more on the military, for example? It could modernise its military a bit quicker, that would feel better for military fans - and few else. There's no present threat we'd need to build our military up against. Equipment shortcomings are more a problem of suboptimal procurement than caused by budget limitations.
The answer may be correct in regard to Japan and Taiwan, but I suspect that Taiwan simply has a different grand strategy than an utterly hopeless arms race with mainland China.

(2) Yes, they do. The U.S. should spend less.
The "Yes, they do" part suffers from the same problem as (1). The "spend less" part makes sense, but it depends of course on the preferences of the U.S. electorate.

(3) Yes, they do. It's what the U.S. wants; be ahead of all other's military capabilities.
Again, same problem as (1) with the "Yes, they do" part. The later part is a reasonable attempt of an explanation in my opinion.

(4) No, they don't. It's no free ride if you pay billions as well.
It's a reasonable perspective, but it doesn't really answer what the critics mean; the different efforts in %GDP.

(5) The greater U.S. expenses are due to its need for greater logistical and forced entry capabilities.
This is again a reasonable explanation for a significant part of the difference in military spending. Let's again take Germany as example; there's simply no reason why we should have a forced entry Marine Corps and a full-fledged amphibious fleet or strategic sea-lift ships. There was a discussion about one amphibious landing ship (enough for a battalion of ground troops) in the 90's and the idea was dismissed.

(6) No, the Europeans don't, for there's no problematic threat to them in sight.
This is a major part of my answer to the question as well. See my explanation in (1).

(7) It depends. About which ally are we speaking?
That's a smart answer - and apparently too smart for many participants of the discussion.
South Korea faces a clear threat and has a strong military (the U.S. forces in South Korea are very small by comparison). It's lacking a modern fighter force to face the PRC's air power, but they have no chance to change this anyway because of their much smaller economy.
Taiwan has a quite 'suboptimal' army and seems to orient its military spending at the scenario of a military air/sea blockade by the mainland Chinese.
Japan could clearly spend more on its military and shape up, especially back in the 90's when it was pouring fortunes into stimulus projects anyway. Japan is on the other hand not in serious conflict with any threat country and might be well-served by a neutrality policy with a defensive military strategy.
The European allies could overpower both the Russian threat and the Arab threat at once. There's no real need for any U.S. military strength for the defence of Europe. It has two nuclear powers, guaranteed air dominance based on European air forces alone, vastly superior ground forces (due to higher quality) and vastly superior naval power. It takes a huge prejudice or ignorance to think that Europe's defence wouldn't be ensured without an unusually high level of U.S. military spending.

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I've sometimes read the opinion that the Europeans would spend more if the U.S. spent less. The opposite may be true.
Some of the European army modernisation efforts are aimed at interoperability; compatibility of communications equipment. Many other costly projects are about buying "modern" equipment ; the old equipment has at times only become outdated due to newer U.S. equipment, not due to threat equipment. The Javelin ATGM with its lock-on infra-red sensor is a good example. TOW could still be considered to be modern and on par with all threats if Javelin wasn't introduced. Some European armies have bought Javelin or the similar Israeli Spike missile.
A U.S. military procurement low tide could contrary to some expectations even reduce European military spending.

The military needs of the East Asian partners of the U.S. are being driven by the increasingly more powerful Chinese military. It's reasonable to say that the latter's growth is at least in part due to the threat posed to China by the U.S.. A great power like China cannot be expected to accept naval and air superiority of a distant great power in its coastal waters. The same can be said about air superiority of the same distant great power over China's territory (in the event of conflict). It's only natural that China invested in a large modern fighter force - and this created the fighter procurement shortfalls of Taiwan, South Korea and Japan in the first place.
A U.S. national defence policy that's more about defence and less about force projection would be less threatening to China and would likely reduce, not increase the military strength needs of Taiwan, South Korea and Japan (although not necessarily their budgets).


The "free ride on U.S. military power" discussion suffers from a U.S. bias. It seems that most voices heard are of American origin. The discussion rarely takes into account that allied and befriended nations often have entirely different expectations for their military, different preferences, different strategies, different threat perceptions ... or the ability to think of threats first and military requirements second.

The ability to deploy 10,000 to 20,000 more troops to Afghanistan, an amphibious invasion fleet or an aerial tanker fleet would have little value to most allies. The idea that they're somehow free riding because the U.S. does things (like the Iraq invasion) that its allies don't want to do is quite fallacious at times. The Iraq invasion was against the political will of most allies, for example. So how would they "free ride" on the U.S. capability to pull off such invasions? The U.S. itself doesn't seem to benefit much of its "force projection" capabilities except some extremely nebulous "global stability" or "dominance" advantages.

It's also noteworthy that the U.S. military spending isn't so high because allied countries asked the U.S. to spend more and more. It's that high due to domestic U.S. political culture and habits. Being "strong on defense" is somehow being regarded as a plus for a national level politician. There's no such (assumption of) preference for military power in most other countries. Republicans boast that they're strong on "defense" and democrats don't dare to be labelled "weak on defense", leading for example to military budget increases under the Obama administration for no other apparent reason.
The reaction to a "I'm strong on defense" statement in a European election campaign would look approximately like this: "Huh? What do you mean? Anyway - what will you do to create more jobs?"

Last but not least, there is a desirable free-riding in regard to non-conventional forces. Taiwan, South Korea and Japan could build up nuclear arsenals if they weren't kinda protected by the nuclear-armed great power USA. The latter doesn't want such nuclear proliferation, so this free ride in terms of nuclear forces is entirely intentional.


It's illogical to accuse others of a "free ride" after raising the own expenditures for domestic reasons to almost half of the global expenditures and without being able to point out against which problem the others should spend more.

Show me a threat that Europe cannot meet on its own or together with a hypothetical 2% GNP military spending U.S. ally and I'll agree that we're not pulling our weight (having a "cheap", albeit not "free" ride).

The greatest concern is Europe's ability to ramp up its military power within 2-6 years in response to the emergence of a real major threat. Demands for more expeditionary capabilities and U.S. forces don't help in this regard. Only U.S. R&D on military tech is helpful, and that's a rather inefficient contribution because U.S. military R&D is extremely cost-inefficient.

Sven Ortmann
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