Unfree labour phantasies in German politics

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(I'll try to keep my distaste for certain proposals and politicians well enough in check to write this piece objectively. It's a tough challenge, for sure!)

Three debates are raging  in German national politics these days;

(1) Reform of the conscription

(2) A provocative book about migrants in Germany

(3) Extending the operating periods for nuclear power plants

I'll discuss the first one (conscription is about to become suspended apparently).

Conservatives have fought hard for conscription in the 50's. A conscription-based Bundeswehr was part of the governments' Western integration grand strategy. The Bundeswehr was meant to contribute with 12 (of a total of 26) divisions for the defence of Western Europe, in Central Europe,  effectively buying Germany a place as almost normal country in the Western World (in combination European unification and reconciliation and cooperation policies with France) shortly after WW2.

It has apparently turned into a conservative party (CDU/CSU) doctrine and ideology since then, for conservatives are the most fierce defenders of conscription in Germany.

Here's an older blog post about conscription in Germany.

The most extreme and in my opinion despicable attempt to save this kind of unfree labour is a proposal of Lower Saxony's minister of the interior, Schünemann.

Nach den Vorstellungen von [...] Schünemann könnte die Dienstpflicht nicht nur in den Streitkräften, sondern auch in der Bundespolizei oder in Zivilschutzverbänden geleistet werden.

(According to the ideas of [...] Schünemann could the service not only be done in the armed forces, but also in the federal police or in civil defence organisations.)

(source: FAZ)

This would actually be legal under our constitution, but not everything that is allowed needs to be done. The constitution allows a lot, including much that Schünemann and his party would not want at all. In fact, the constitution demands plebiscites - which his party opposes fiercely.

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The central problem is habituation.

Humans can get used to the greatest nonsense and damages.

Lean back, relax, free your mind. Imagine a world that hasn't seen conscription for generations. You should really muster your imagination and distance yourself from what you're used to.
No major power threatens our country, in fact no real power does. All is fine.

Suddenly, a politician makes his way into newspaper headlines with the idea to force our youth into unfree labour - underpaid, of course. He also wants to strip those who serve their unfree labour period in the military of some of their free speech rights.

Keep in mind; the military can easily make do without unfree labour, the federal police has never employed unfree labourers and the civil defence organisations don't need that either.

What would our reaction be?

My guess:

* We would draw parallels with the Nazis one year forced labour which they imposed on all young men. Many wouldn't hold back and call him a Nazi.

* We would point out that there's absolutely no necessity for unfree labour.

* We would point out that we want and have a free society, and unnecessary unfree labour is an assault on our civil liberties.

* We would protest as much as necessary to get this irresponsible politician gets fired from office.

Why doesn't this happen?

Simple: Germans got used to the abhorrent concept of conscription. They got used enough to it that many even tolerate it in times of no real threat whatsoever. Myths and lies have been formed and spread around conscription to defend it, the fact that almost only German-speaking country retain conscription in Europe isn't well-represented in news at all.

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The German society is increasingly under burden of the long-term consequences of political decisions made in the 50's and 60's (and myths created in that period). This was a period of almost exclusive conservative-liberal governance and thus the conservatives stem against some reforms that would address these problems. Some problems aren't on the to-do list of any party because their roots have become so self-evident and unquestioned that  no party has an internal majority in favour of facing the issue. The export orientation and trade balance surplus is such a problem that has been turned into a strength in federal German mythology.

Conscription on the other hand is a legacy of the early Cold War and the Western integration grand strategy that keeps haunting and hurting us for no other reason than the fact that the party which fought for its introduction fights against its suspension, too.

Sven Ortmann
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Guttenberg's five proposals

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(Disclosure: My opinion on conscription.)

The German Minister of Defence v.Guttenberg has offered five proposals in the discussion about the conscription. He's expected to face the most resistance from his own party (the Bavarian CSU) - in part because of party politics (he's a rising star of the party and a threat to its chairman) and in part due to the dogmatic pro-conscription stance of the CDU/CSU.

Said conscription has turned into a farce because only a few ten thousand young men serve annually - and only so for six months due to the influence of the anti-conscription junior federal government coalition party (FDP, liberals).

Here are Guttenberg's five proposals:

Modell eins sieht einen Gesamtumfang von 205.000 Soldaten vor. Die Zahl der Berufs- und Zeitsoldaten wird in zwei Schritten bis 2012 auf 155.000 reduziert. Es bleibt bei 25.000 Grundwehrdienstleistenden W6 und 25.000 FWDL.
Modell zwei wäre die Radikalverkleinerung in drei Schritten bis 2013 auf 150.000 Berufs- und Zeitsoldaten. Keine Wehrpflichtigen, keine Kurzdiener. Die Einberufungen enden 2011.

Modell drei: Ebenfalls vom kommenden Jahr an keine Einberufungen mehr, Abschmelzen in sechs Schritten bis 2016 auf 156.000 Berufs- und Zeitsoldaten.
Modell vier: 156.000 Berufs- und Zeitsoldaten (in sechs Schritten bis 2016) plus Freiwilligenkomponente von 7500 Kurzdienern. Guttenberg hat bereits deutlich gemacht, dass er sich auch vorstellen könne, diese Komponente auf bis zu 15.000 aufzustocken, wenn das Parlament das wünsche – ein Hinweis mit Appellcharakter an den Haushaltsausschuss.
Modell fünf mit insgesamt 210.000 Mann ähnelt Modell eins: 180.000 Berufs- und Zeitsoldaten plus 30.000 Grundwehrdienstleistende. Hier kursiert die Bewertung, dieser Ansatz wäre um zwei Milliarden Euro teurer als Modell 4.

(source: FAZ)

translation:

Model one envisions a total strength of 205,000 soldiers. The count of professional and volunteer soldiers will be reduced in two steps to 155,000 till 2012. It remains at 25,000 conscripts W6 (six months) and 25,000 extended term conscripts (conscripts who volunteered toe extend their service to up to 23 months).

Model two would be a radical shrinking in three steps  till 2013 down to 150,000 professional and volunteer soldiers. No conscripts, no short-service soldiers. The Bundeswehr would stop calling  conscripts in 2011.

Model three: Likewise no calls of conscripts beginning in 2011, reduction in six steps till 2016 down to 156,000 professional and volunteer soldiers.

Model four: 156,000 professional and volunteer soldiers (in six steps till 2016) plus volunteer component of 7,500 short service soldiers. Guttenberg has already expressed that he could expand this to 15,000 if the parliament wants it - a hint at the treasury committee.

Model five with a total of 210,000 men resembles model one: 180,000 professional and volunteer soldiers plus 30,000 conscripts. This is rumoured to be two billion Euros more expensive than model four.

(Explanation: I called those volunteers who volunteered for four (enlisted), eight (junior NCOs) or twelve  (junior officers) years. "Professional soldiers" was my translation for those NCOs and officers who either stayed in the Bundeswehr after that volunteer period or joined afterwards with needed civilian skills (such as doctors) - these continue to serve till retirement.)

It's big news that a debate about the Bundeswehr has made it into the first slot of evening TV news. Such discussions are rather rare.

The five models don't look promising, and it's most likely a waste of time to discuss them in detail for lack of detail and because they're just starting points for a discussion that's expected to last for months because Chancellor Merkel is incapable of quick decision-making (she prefers to play party politics instead of addressing issues).

The savings will likely be disappointing (model five's description already hints at it) and the impact on force structure may very well be disadvantageous. There was an expectation that new infantry units if not formations would be raised/reactivated because the parallel overseas missions have exposed the lack of light troops. This is extremely unlikely to happen in all five models.

I personally don't oppose all personnel or budget cuts for the Bundeswehr or frequent structural reforms.

Instead I'm all for doing it right: Cut the fat, reorganise to an efficient force optimised for its constitutional mission with the very low medium term level of threat and very strong alliances in mind. I fail to recognise this in the whole discussion.

Sven Ortmann
 
(photo: Bienert)

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Bundeswehr structure - what I would do

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It's easy to criticise details and develop ideas for niches, but difficult to balance conflicting preferences and needs. It's just fair to take a position on the whole thing for a change.

Here's my concept for a Bundeswehr structure.

The general idea is to

(1) maintain the competencies

(2) improve in order to remove known defects

(3) improve in order to meet new conditions

(4) be prepared for a rapid two-year expansion to a mighty continental army

(5) waste no national wealth

The conscription should be deactivated immediately. Its reactivation should not require more than a simple Bundestag majority. Its greatest short-term relevance would be in the mobilisation of civilian logisticians, technicians, medical personnel, construction personnel and pilots.

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Luftwaffe (air force):

The air force should think of itself primarily as an operational level continental land war air force. Think of 1940, but more politically correct.

* The Typhoon is a fine aircraft for the 2010s, but we should begin to look for a successor concept (or two). A KWS (update) should be planned for the late 2010s. Numbers of aircraft and wings aren't nearly as important as are numbers of qualified pilots. We can draw an overwhelming quantity of qualified personnel for maintenance and repair from the private sector.

* Air defence is important, but it should be worth its money. Quantity of firing units needs to be meaningful; the present MEADS plans are crap.

* Specialised support functions should be established as EU or NATO assets similar to AWACS.

* The Luftwaffe needs rather small air-lift capability and no NH90. Huge civilian air-lift and helicopter capabilities would be available in times of defensive alliance warfare.

Deutsche Marine (navy):

The focus should be on Baltic Sea, Mediterranean and North Sea. There's no need for a high seas or expeditionary navy as long as several European allies comply to their urge to be great naval powers.

* Only small quantities of frigates, mine counter-measure boats and submarines are necessary for retaining of competencies.

* Maritime SAR helicopters should be civilian (federal police, for example).

* Standardisation on one (on-board capable) naval multi-role helicopter with modest capabilities.

* Containerised solutions for minelaying, standoff mine countermeasures, support and other ship functions should be developed and tested on small chartered container ships.

* One squadron Typhoons should be transferred to navy command in order to ensure that the air/sea strike mission competence is retained. Air force pilots should be assigned to the squadron by the ministry.

* Land-based surface-to-ship missiles should be introduced.

Heer (army):

I propose a three-part army, optimised for the Eastern NATO border.

* A 99% German, exemplary (small) Corps with a good mix of forces for Eastern European defence - as good as it gets. (x)

* Bilateral or multilateral corps that are more than mere staffs. The typical German contribution per such corps would be the equivalent of a large brigade. The actual cooperations depend in part on our neighbours, of course.

* The army schools and a single mixed Lehrbrigade (training, experiment and show formation) that's NOT supposed to be high on any emergency deployment list.

The army units would also be divided into active force and dedicated reserve formations. The reserve formations would primarily train infantry and possibly engineers (for labour-intensive engineer tasks) and be based on very short-serving volunteers. The service would end exactly when they are trained. The purpose is the reserve, not having active formations. This reserve training component would replace the conscription both in regard to recruiting volunteers and to maintaining a strong trained personnel reserve.

Streitkräftebasis (combat service support):

* Huge personnel reductions are possible here.

* The whole concept of a tri-service CSS service should be revamped based on lessons learned.

Regrettably, I'm not very well-informed about the Streitkräftebasis and don't dare to offer more specific proposals.

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The necessary strengths in peace, upon mobilisation and upon mobilisation after a two-year expansion would need to be defined with both possible threats and allied capabilities (EU allies) in mind. I suspect that an active strength reduction below 200,000 personnel is acceptable, but the minimum would likely be around 150,000. The goal for strength after expansion & mobilisation should be more than 500,000 + rear security forces and logistics units consisting of older (conscription-era) reservists.

The most important changes would be outside the scope of a force structure. Our personnel system and administration need to be revamped (this is probably true for all NATO forces). Failed experiments need to be concluded.

Politicians need to understand the concept and be ready to intitiate the two-year expansion early once necessary. Such a build-up should be understood not as an escalation that leads inevitably to war but as the production of a subject for negotiation - it would after all only be necessary as a counterweight to another power's build-up.

It's similar with large-scale exercises; make them regular.

Likewise, soldiers need to understand the concept. The small size must not lead to approaches that would be unsustainable and unsuitable during an expansion. Instead, the small force should see the possibility of a quick expansion as its raison d'être.

Sven Ortmann

(x): This is where my most unorthodox ideas are concentrated. An army corps of my design would look and operate very, very unlike present corps and divisions.

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The "West German RPG-7"

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The RPG-7 gets much attention because it's been proliferated all over the world, and therefore its role in modern conflicts. There are even admirers who miss such a weapon in NATO's arsenals; a simple, cheap launcher of acceptable weight with a wide range of warheads.

Well, the Bundeswehr actually had a very, very close equivalent till the 90's when it was replaced by the Panzerfaust 3.

I'm writing about the Panzerfaust 44 "Lanze" (lance). Panzerfaust 44-2 and Panzerfaust 44-2A1 actually; the difference is the sight mount.


Here's a comparison with a standard contemporary RPG-7:

	Panzerfaust 44 Lanze	RPG-7 with PG-7V
Calibre: Barrel	44 mm	40 mm
Calibre: Warhead	67 mm	85 mm
Length unloaded	880 mm	950 mm
Length loaded	1180 mm	?
Weight unloaded	7.82 kg	7.9 kg
Weight loaded	10.12 kg	9.15 kg
Muzzle velocity	170 m/s	120 m/s
Maximum velocity	212 m/s	300 m/s
Armour penetration RHAeq CE	375 mm	330 mm

The performance difference in weight : velocity can be explained with a useful characteristic of the PzF 44: It has a (slightly) reduced backblast thanks to an iron powder counter-mass behind the propellant. The penalty is a higher weight. The weapon was still not cleared for use in confined spaces, though.

The lower velocities also limited the official effective ranges to 200m (moving taget) or 300 m (stationary target) instead of 300 and 500 m respectively. The Lanze's telescopic sight had 100-200-300-400 markings, though.

Western Germany did not develop larger and different warheads for the Lanze, unlike the Soviet Union and Russia with the RPG-7. There were no thermobaric, tandem shaped charge or larger calibre warheads for Lanze. That's why the RPG-7 of today is much more powerful - given the right ammunition - than Lanze ever was. There's a rumour about the existence of a multi-purpose grenade for Lanze, but it wasn't mentioned in the Bundeswehr's field manual (ZDV 3-16).

A larger calibre would have lead to unacceptable weight increases unless the principle of the munition had been changed. In the end, the Bundeswehr introduced the Panzerfaust 3 instead, which had a 110 mm warhead and its 60 mm barrel is part of the ammunition (only the sights are reusable). The Panzerfaust 3 had an unacceptably long development and testing time, being introduced in 1992 after a tactical requirement of 1973. It had been obsolete against ERA-equipped Warsaw Pact tanks for ten years at the time of its introduction.

Different versions of the Panzerfaust 3 weapon have been procured; especially an anti-ERA version (1998) and the Bunkerfaust, meant to defeat opponents behind walls.

The problematic lack of an intermediate infantry grenade munition between 40mmx46 low velocity grenades and an about 11 kg heavy Panzerfaust 3 round led to the late introduction of the RGW 60 and in the future possibly RGW 90 as well.

Sven Ortmann

P.S.: If in doubt, trust my figures about the Lanze. They're from an official document. Some web pages assert a higher range against moving targets and different sight range markings.
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Sex in the Army

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The USA has apparently one of the last NATO militaries (4/26) that discriminates gays and lesbians (because a U.S. law demand it). There are currently political efforts to end that, and the result is a minor cultural war.

*Somehow* this reminded me of an old video that shows (in a hilarious way) how sex topics can embarrass soldiers way beyond their capability to cope with it. I always wanted to show this hilarious video clip sometime. :-)

(German video)

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Times have changed

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Back in 2001, many people got crazy. Military forces were used for policy and additional funds were made available for them. The U.S. armed services were almost buried under the amount of money that flowed into their budget.

Back in 2007, the beginning economic crisis and soon shrinking Iraq invovlement should have led to an end of the money flood, back to normal. This didn't happen, first due to normal lags and later ebcause fiscal austerity was damned as economic suicide by a grassroots wannabe economic experts movement that took over the mainstream media in most Western nations in a few weeks last year.

The time of economic "stimulus package" (or "we cannot do much of use, but we can pretend to save the world by spending!") politics seems to be over now, and finally, things go back to normal. Well, there's at least a trend in that direction.

The published attitudes seem to have moved during the past few weeks. Maybe it was the impression that Greece left on us. Maybe the time was simply right: Cutting military budgets in order to cure the budget disasters has become a real topic, and an accepted one.

The German Einzelplan 14 budget will probably be cut by about a billion Euros per year, but that's peanuts in comparison to the expected cuts in the UK, Greece and U.S.. Even Spain and Italy might easily exceed that sum.

The strange thing about this is that military spending should be about external factors (such as threats), not about internal ones. Save for procurement activities of lasting effect; doesn't the ability to cut military budgets due to fiscal problems kind of prove that we spent too much before?

Sven Ortmann
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Gaza blockade

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The French minister of foreign affairs has apparently said that the EU would be ready (even happy) to take over the naval blockade of Gaza in order to prevent arms transports to Hamas.

That smells as if there's a 10-20% probabiltiy that the German navy will get one more distant patrol mission.

I hope that they'll at least drop one other mission in exchange if Merkel agrees to yet another naval patrol mission.

Sven Ortmann

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Allensbach poll on Germans in Afghanistan

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The Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach has published a new poll on the German ISAF mission.

www.FAZ.net article (in German)

(The article has additional interesting results for other questions.)

They asked Germans the question "Würden Sie rückblickend sagen, dass es ein Fehler war, sich an der Schutztruppe in Afghanistan zu beteiligen?"

("Would you say that, in retrospect, it was a mistake to participate in the protection force in Afghanistan?")

"Es war ein Fehler" ("It was a mistake") answered

59% of the group 'whole population'

48% among CDU (social conservatives) voters

59% among SPD (social democrats) voters

46% among FDP (liberals) voters

70% among Grüne (greens) voters

85% among Linke (socialists) voters

This confirms older polls (here and here); a majority is against the German participation.

Especially interesting and wicked is the situation for the greens; the SPD and greens were in power and led by decidedly centre/moderate top politicians (now retired) into both the Kosovo Air War and the initial Afghanistan mission.

Green party top politicians still paint the ISAF mission as a kind of women's liberation and human rights mission and dream about building schools and such. The party supports the ISAF mission.

The green voter base thinks differently; the greens were (until their loss of pacifist principles in 1998) THE German peace party. The socialists try hard to fill the gap.

Obviously, many - indeed most - green voters didn't buy into the green party leadership's delusions about the ISAF mission.

Sven Ortmann

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