About tanks, and why they're a necessity in modern ground forces

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I intended to write about this topic (What's a tank good for, and does its end near?) for a while. A reply written by me on a forum turned out to be so long and exhaustive that it's really what I had planned for the blog. Lazy as I am, I'll copy it.

[...] however my confusion remains. What is/ where is the utility and value of the MBT?

The Main Battle Tank is a vehicle that was developed for intentional use in line-of-sight combat. its crew is capable of justifying the investment into the tank team and the hardware by exploiting the degree of protection offered by the tank for the critical mass of survivability on the battlefield.

This critical mass does not include invulnerability, but rather vastly reduced or entirely negated effectiveness of most threat weapons. The tank is still vulnerable to few threat weapons - crew training and tank tactics are required to counter these threats for additional survivability on the mission.

The high survivability in comparison to "light" forces (especially on open ground) in combination with the internal combustion engine's power offer a high mobility (with a heavyweight weaponry and ammunition) on the battlefield.

This high practical mobility in face of many threats can be exploited by large unit and formation tactics to great effect.

Tanks can also be used with assault gun tactics; in this case they serve on the offence as fire support platforms with weapons and ammunitions heavier than practical for dismounted troops.

The best targets for a tank are those which justify the expenditure of scarce ammunition and the risk involved. Hostile main battle tanks are sometimes in this category, sometimes not. It depends on the other forces' ability to deal with them (does your army have enough effective threats against hostile tanks?).

(This ability was in doubt since 1940. Anti-tank guns were largely immobile, dedicated tank destroyers/Jagdpanzer were a kind of tank themselves, infantry and engineer anti-tank munitions were very rarely able to withstand concentrated breakthrough attempts.

The problem continued during the Cold War when shaped charge-based weapons were able to penetrate tanks mostly with unpredictable effect. Their employment either required vicinity (and weighed down the dismounted troops) or depended on missile guidances and long flight times - both offering countermeasure opportunities to the enemy.

In short; there was little trust in the non-tank-based anti-tank capabilities.)

 

[End of forum reply]

Positions such as "it's necessary for Blitzkrieg" or "it's the best anti-tank weapon" fall short of really explaining the military-technical phenomenon of the tank. Armoured combat vehicles (not necessarily only main battle tanks) fill a niche for which there's no satisfactory substitute. That's why they don't go away.

Some tank designs can prove to be unsatisfactory - especially if they don't reach the critical mass of protection. This explains the demise of the light tank since WW2. Other tanks prove unsatisfactory because they aren't efficient enough or don't fit into the operational doctrine any more (such as short-legged heavy tanks as the T-10).

Finally, there's the main battle tank which actually evolved into a very mobile heavy tank during the 70's when the Leopard 2 was developed.

Quote "Jane's Weapon Systems 1976":

Previously, when a tank had better armour the performance and mobility declined; in designing the Leopard 2 the Germans have reversed this trend, the end result being a superior vehicle.

Leopard 2A4, externally similar to the early Leopard 2 as introduced in '79.

So the tank is here to stay (although in much-reduced quantity as it seems). Countermeasures against it provoke counter-countermeasures. This seems to be unavoidable because modern armies need to fill the armoured combat vehicle's niche and there's simply no satisfactory substitute.

Tanks are dying and becoming obsolete all the time - but there will always appear some (new models or upgrades) that are not obsolete (yet).

Sven Ortmann

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Schwerpunkt and "Klotzen, nicht kleckern!" - the balance problem

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"Klotzen, nicht Kleckern! (Boot'em, don't spatter'em!) is one of many famous quotes of Guderian.It shows one example of the Clausewitzian concept of Schwerpunkt (concentrating forces to be strong enough for the decisive battle) in the art of war.

This concept is universally known and somewhat understood (there are misunderstandings!). The real challenge isn't to decide on a Schwerpunkt approach, but to balance between the Schwerpunkt and the other remaining forces.

Clausewitz understood that you need to leave a minimum of forces on duty elsewhere even while amassing forces for a decisive battle. World War battles show this very well; Reserves were sent to the location of offensives, but in fact most forces were left to guard other sections of the front line.

I mentioned Guderian, in part because he provides an interesting example for this challenge in procurement. The infantry of WW2 had great difficulties to advance against defenders on open terrain. The obvious solution was armour support, and thanks to a request/idea by von Manstein this armour support was developed in the form of the early assault gun; a normal tank with a casemate gun and high explosive grenades. Guderian opposed this, fearing for the strength of the armoured divisions; assault guns were competing for funds and production capacities.

Guderian was initially mostly successful, in this internal struggle for resources and the concentration on tanks for the fast troops instead of for infantry divisions is often cited as a superior decision of the Germans in comparison to the French decision to disperse many tanks as infantry support vehicles in 1940.

History didn't end in 1940 and neither did WW2. The actual history went on proving that assault guns were needed (and extremely successful). This was even acknowledged and understood by Guderian, whose armour branch never got enough tanks (but tank divisions were in fact partially equipped with assault guns late in the war) anyway.

The optimisation problem is evident: Back in 1940 the decisive action was the armoured spearhead in the centre an it needed almost all armoured strength. The infantry divisions didn't need to advance much for early operational success. The circumstances were different in 1942-1945 and required a difference balance.

"Klotzen, nicht kleckern!" is a maxim, but maxims must not replace thinking. Maximisation and minimisation are rarely the best idea; we should always strive for optimisation.

- - - - -

The Western forces of the 60's to 90's had a very important balance problem as well. They had to balance between "line" divisions (equivalent to the vast majority of German WW2 divisions, the infantry divisions) and the mobile operational strike forces (equivalent to the few armoured & motorised German divisions of WW2). Eventually, the former atrophied and the latter formed almost the whole for Western forces. The operational consequences of having no forces to establish and maintain a somewhat stable line were probably never understood.

The new post-2003 forces of Western nations have partially evolved away from this problem, as even the armoured forces (supposedly "Cold War dinosaurs") atrophied, leaving us mostly with support troops, the traditional strength of light infantry (mountain, airborne) and some motorised infantry.

We were lucky that the imbalance of the previous generation of forces was never truly tested and exposed in war. Let's hope that we'll be lucky enough to never see the present imbalance tested seriously before we inevitably get rid of it

The Schwerpunkt concept remains valid, but it requires a good balancing in every application. Those other forces that are not focused on the supposedly decisive action are essential and must not be reduced too much.

Sven Ortmann

photo: Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-139-1112-17 / Knobloch, Ludwig / CC-BY-SA
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Doctrine No.18: Tactics nowadays

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The French military journal "Doctrine" committed a whole issue to the adaption of tactical art to small war circumstances and finally published it in English as well.

N° 18 : TACTICS NOWADAYS

from

www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/...

Contents:

DOCTRINE

* Back to the Art of Tactics
* Radical Changes... and Continuity in the Tactical Field - New Conditions for Operations
* Offensive, Defensive, Security, Assistance Operations - Current Trends between ther four types of Operations
* Simulation assets to Study Tactics to the benefit of Commanders and Operational Headquarters

INTERNATIONAL

* A British Perspective - Land Operations a Military Philosophy

ACCOUNTS AND THOUGHTS

* Our Tactical Heritage since de Guibert
* The Detterent Pressure or Gulliver Unbound
* AAR : Review and perspectives
* Basic principles, you've Said : Basic Principles...
* Concept of Operations : a Change in Questionings
* FT-02 : Converting the Try

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The "age of movement to contact"

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Movement to contact is the most primitive form of offensive movement with deployed forces. Tactics and Operational art manuals & books are full of much more effective and elaborate forms of offensive movements.

This didn't prevent the "age of movement to contact".

Exercises are often about incredibly slow-paced and do often allow for the "deliberate attack". This attack requires reconnaissance, planning, orders, preparations, movement into positions and finally the attack itself. It's the philharmonic orchestra version of battle.
Officers are usually aware that this is utterly unrealistic unless it's about a breakthrough battle in otherwise static warfare.

A hasty operation is an operation in which a commander directs his immediately available forces, using fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), to perform activities with minimal preparation, trading planning and preparation time for speed of execution. A deliberate operation is an operation in which a commander’s detailed intelligence concerning the situation allows him to develop and coordinate detailed plans, including multiple branches and sequels. He task organizes his forces specifically for the operation to provide a fully synchronized combined arms team. He conducts extensive rehearsals while conducting shaping operations to set the conditions for the conduct of his decisive operation.

FM 3-90 (2001, U.S. Army)

Fortified, static front lines as in much of WWI and WWII are impossible in almost all modern warfare scenarios, though. The German, French and Soviet armies of WW2 consisted of a few highly mobile divisions and about 85-95% foot-mobile infantry divisions. The latter formed the static front lines while the mobile forces prepared for the next mobile warfare phase.

Today's armies are smaller versions of the mobile forces, with no bulk of slow infantry divisions.

Land warfare between conventional forces would probably have calm phases when no side dares to close in, but there would be almost no set-piece, deliberate attack battles.

The established alternative to the deliberate attack in less slow motion-ish situations is known as "hasty attack" in English. "Hasty attack" is deceptive; it's still nothing that's done without substantial preparations.

- - - - -

Forces which were presented with a new tactical situation every two days in peacetime exercises found themselves reacting to new developments every few hours against the Iraqi forces in 2003. The Iraqi forces were certainly not known for their mobile warfare prowess. A hostile force that masters mobile warfare would pose an even greater challenge and likely often times cause a temporary breakdown of command by brigade and division staffs.

A German armour regiment commander defeated a clearly superior French tank concentration in 1940 with a handful of competitive tanks and many light (rather suitable for training) tanks. He moved a lot, attacked here then there - employing his useless light tanks for deception and his few medium tanks as the hard hitters. This kind of tactical brilliance decided many battles against superior tank forces, even against the T-34 in late '41 and in '42. A movement to contact against such tactical brilliance is a recipe for disaster if not outright suicide (+manslaughter of subordinates).

- - - - -

This is usually the time when writers begin to blather about the OODA loop (observe-orient-decide-act) and how completing the loop quicker than the adversary means to get inside something and to win.

The sad fact is that instead the OODA theory breaks down at this speed. The "observe" part is the first one that breaks down; the iconic situational awareness (holy golden calf of ground forces RMA and focal point of the marketing of many military hardware suppliers) fails.

Ground forces which operate at high speed often lose their understanding of the surroundings - they simply stumble into the enemy - they do movements to contact if they advance at all.

Movement to contact is a type of offensive operation designed to develop the situation and establish or regain contact (...). A commander conducts this type of offensive operation when the tactical situation is not clear or when the enemy has broken contact.

FM 3-90 (2001, U.S. Army)

This is not necessarily a bad thing; many incredibly one-sided battles in military history were begun with a movement to contact by either one or both forces. The problem is that in a movement to contact the only advantage to be had is the superior readiness for battle. A commander who conducts a movement to conduct does not use more advanced tactics for additional, unfair advantages over the enemy.

This readiness for battles includes everything associated with small units; hardware, morale, training, ammunition, vigilance, leader's talent, relative positioning and facing and so on.

It does not include operational art at all. A force which conducts a movement to conduct and stumbles into an enemy has likely few if any advantages built up on the operational or formation tactical level.

The exception is of course the specific case when the operational leader intentionally seeks decisive combat ASAP because he is sure about the own forces' superior battle readiness. There's a name for this tactic that slips out of my memory one I read it.

This was the standard in 2003, and the Iraqis were way too demoralised and incompetent to exploit this negligence. The failure of the operational and formation tactical level to create substantial advantages through clever manoeuvres was not punished. No harsh punishment (such as the French were punished for their operational failure in 1940 and the Soviets in 1941, the British in 1942) meant little attention and little learning effect.

The Israelis blundered into Lebanon in 2006, were punished for their blunders by Hezbollah (embarrassing!) and worked hard on rectifying their issues ever since. The Russians blundered into Georgia and succeeded against Georgian forces that were about as incapable of exploiting blunders as were the Iraqis - but nevertheless the Russians seem to have recognised their blunders in that short episode.

NATO members on the other hand became immediately distracted by occupation duties including the frustrating fight against pesky, minimally capable yet elusive opponents. They replaced the failed RMA fashion with the COIN fashion and oh boy, we know how well that one performed.

It looks as if they slept over the necessary learning and issue correction phase in regard to mobile warfare proficiency on the operational and formation tactical level.

- - - - -

Modern operational art has nice books with basics, but it seems to be out of synch with modern ground forces' mobility.

The age of movement to contact should be ended ASAP. The key to this is to fix the "situational awareness" thing - but not the military-industrial way. That one has failed badly, and at high fiscal cost.

Instead, the answer should be operational and tactical.

I have a proposal for this, but I have also mercy for the readers of this text, so I won't turn it into a long book chapter right now.

Sven Ortmann

edit:fixed a typo

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The waning of the 2005-2010 COIN theory fashion wave

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The star of the new COIN fashion is certainly descending. The wave came up in about 2005 as a response to the dumbness in Iraq and attempted to give a smart answer to the challenges of the occupation in Iraq. Military history, shooting star advisers (typically ranked Colonel or close) and even social scientists became involved.

The FM 3-24 became this fashion movement's manifest and the Small Wars Journal became its expert media centre. Petraeus became its representative in the mainstream media, while the ranks of advisors like Kilcullen became the more important figures for experts.

Previously, Americans believed that the USMC Small Wars Manual was great and Brits believed their Northern Ireland and Malaya strategies were the benchmark.

By 2006 there was a new sect in town, with its own bible and prophets.

The new strategy downplayed the combat component and became more Sun Tsu-like. Break away hostile factions from the enemy's ranks, keep the enemy from acquiring more allies, win more allies for yourself.

All this diplomacy was of course no job for the diplomatic corps of the involved nations. No, these nations weren't enough in war to mobilise many diplomats for it.

Army lieutenants, captains, majors and colonels were supposed to become diplomats, administrators, politicians.

Privates were expected to be(come) highly disciplined and behave "strategically", i.e. understand the strategic intents of the theatre commands and not sabotage it with gut-led (re)actions.

Much can be written about this new COIN theory, and it was. Much of it is easily accessible in the internet or book-stores and doesn't need to be repeated here.

The problems were quite fundamental, though:

* The troops at level battalion and below had to meet atypical expectations.

* The environment needed to be fertile for the strategy.

It looked as if practical success crowned the theory. The U.S.Army had finally published FM 3-24, politicians had launched a "surge" as a domestic policy trick to maintain the political initiative and to buy yet another year of popular/political support for the war in Iraq.

It's too bad that they were kind of a sideshow all along. The Iraqis had their parallel power struggles and ethnic cleansing. The Iraqis were finishing these in 2007 and the violence ebbed away.

Some Americans were almost enthusiastic - the coincidental application of the new COIN theory was crowned by the ability to transmit good news to home.

Meanwhile, the Taliban had their slow yet constant return in Afghanistan, along with other armed groups in opposition to domination by the mayor of Kabul or his viceroys.

Proponents called for another "surge"; more troops, new COIN theory. Some experts warned that recipes from Iraq should not be applied 1:1 in Afghanistan albeit there was no "for Iraq only" in the title of FM 3-24.

The effect so far: There's not even a dent in the disadvantageous trends. Every new year becomes worse than the previous one, and hope in the mayor of Kabul is eroding.

The tragedy is probably that the new COIN theory is likely a fair weather theory. It works if the population is willing to allow it to work. It's nothing that you can enforce.

The proper time for the new COIN theory's application in Iraq was probably 2003 and for its application in Afghanistan was probably 2002-2004*. The populations were probably ready to cooperate as envisaged by the COIN theory at that time.

War sows much hate and mistrust. The environment got tainted too much and COIN was obviously unable to deliver convincing results under such conditions.

- - - - -

There's a quote from Churchill:

The Americans will always do the right thing ... after they've exhausted all the alternatives.

That quote has a true core; wars are often a trial & error exercise. Peacetime preparations cannot fully prepare an army for war; it needs to learn on the job. Long wars make this easily visible. Armies triumph quickly if they got much right in their preparations, sometimes by sheer luck and coincidence (or simply because their political leaders had sent them against a weak nation).

Others defeat their enemies because they themselves adapted to the previously misunderstood realities of the war. This does often coincide with a huge and superior economical war effort.

Afghanistan does not seem to suit these paths well. The Western forces didn't get it right initially. Adaptiveness doesn't seem to work well beyond mere survivability efforts. Finally, more resources don't seem to leave much of an impression. Their offensive use is restricted by the enemy's elusiveness and political/moral restraints that are utterly necessary in order to avoid a perversion of the war.

- - - - -

Enthusiasm for modern COIN theory is waning, but so is support for the war itself. A rational and well-informed analysis should have told us from the very beginning that staying there in 2003 was a stupid idea.

Now even less rational analysis leads many to lose confidence in the idea of direct Western military involvement in Afghanistan. The utter lack of success in combination with the vastly increased effort and rising toll wears down the ranks of the supporters.

COIN theory and its representatives were not shiny rescuers. They created much noise that covered the reasons for the decreasing violence in Iraq and they served politicians as tools for an extension of stupid wars.

And just to make sure there's no misunderstanding; nobody should believe that a nation should enter the next stupid war just because there's probably the right theory on the bookshelf for keeping it under control. All stupid wars are wrong wars. Stick to national self defence and alliance defence!

Sven Ortmann

*: Not joining and sticking with stupid, needless wars is of course even better.

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On infantry small unit development

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(First a disclaimer: I'm going to write about warfare with opponents who have corrected vision, comparable combat morale and who can aim.)

Some authors claim that a German infantry squad of WW2 typically had 80% of its firepower concentrated in its one machine gun; a MG34 or MG42.

That was probably quite correct, but the carried ammunition and practical rate of fire indicate a slight exaggeration.

The issue was more fundamental than simple mechanical or material statistics, though. A machine gunner has the feeling that he can actually achieve much in battle and has typically a different psychology in effect than most other soldiers have.

Infantry is not all the same - you cannot give a special weapon to just anyone and expect always the same results. Differences are also deeper than mere qualifications and physical fitness or strength.

Some soldiers are aggressive, many are capable if lead well and some are basically porters, not fighters. The most basic problem for infantry is therefore to identify who belongs to which group and to assign jobs and missions accordingly (and possibly reject the porter guys).

The aggressive, daring guys who are very difficult to suppress need to become leaders (the smart ones) or operators for the most important weapons (such as a machine gun).

A 80/20 or 70/30 rule of thumb fits to many forms of human activity: 20-30% of the people have 80-70% of the overall effect (Pareto Principle). This is applicable to the spreading of diseases, the work in staffs, the kills of World War fighter pilots, the number of friends on social networking sites, the performance of snipers, the performance of computer gamers, the success in flirting and it's also relevant for infantry combat.

We can dream on in fantasy land and look at a platoon as a small unit of 20-50 equal men, but that's not going to be confirmed in intense combat.

- - - - -

OK, let's say we succeed to assign the most valuable men to the leadership jobs or give them the most powerful weapons. What does this tell us about the others in the platoon or squad?

The readers may not like it, but to be honest; the average assault rifle user will be little more than an ammunition porter for the main weapons and a rear/flank security man and message relay.

How does this fit to the everyone-a-super-soldier approach of modern Western infantry equipment programs? The average assault rifle user has got some heavy AT weapon, a designated marksman rifle or an underbarrel grenade launcher nowadays. He's so overloaded with his own kit that carrying additional ammunition for a machine gunner or a platoon commando mortar reduces the mobility to that of a four-year old.

The technology-driven approach with a flair of combined arms (accurate single shots, full auto suppressive fires, high trajectory HE projection) down to squad or even fire team level may be a terrible misunderstanding.

To equip everyone with better rifle optics than were available to WW2 snipers isn't going to turn everyone into a super soldier either. The sights may be worth their weight and bulk, but they don't turn cowards or extremely frightened and shaking men into cold-blooded fighters with an overwhelming lethality in a 400 m radius.

Such equipment will still have the greatest effect with the few men who are psychologically best prepared for combat (this may include being simply too dumb or crazy to understand the danger - in fact, smart people rarely turn out to be among the most daring).

It's probably about time that the psychological differences between infantrymen again consciously influence the setup of infantry small units. This ranges from personnel selection over equipment to tactics and TO&Es (tables of organisation and equipment).

Combat in complex, though. It may be a good idea to 'waste' some good weapons on not very good soldiers in order to distract hostiles, to relieve the few over-performers off (suppressive fires) pressure.

Next, we should keep in mind another pressing challenge: The extreme lethality of modern weapons. Forget about the experiences against unskilled paramilitary (or lesser) fighters in recent warfare. The extreme lethality of modern infantry battalion arsenals (up to 120 mm mortars) restricts the infantry small unit repertoire for most actions. Only very high pay-off actions justify very risky tactics. Most often infantry needs to be very cautious in order to preserve itself for important actions (the military view) and a life after the war (the individual's view).

The combination of high lethality and cautious behaviour leads quite naturally to very short yet intense fire fights with (whenever possible) the advantage of surprise, followed by a quick withdrawal and rallying. The latter is necessary in order to avoid being stuck (and fixed) in a protracted fire fight till hostile mortars end it.

This justifies an emphasis on the right weapons (and munitions) for such an action. A salvo of M72 or SARPAC-like weapons, a very high rate of fire for the machine gun (with an appropriate, stable tripod) and the use of command-detonated mines (~Claymores) are possible answers.

Another approach might emphasize stealth and the avoidance of breaking said stealth. A minimised muzzle fire thanks to suppressors and optimised flash hiders, barrel lengths and cartridges as well as the employment of deception tools (fake muzzle fires) are imaginable.

There's also the possibility that both the own and the hostile infantry are very cautious and often stumble into each other at short range. That could be avoided with detached scout pairs and the use of military dogs, but it's still a possibility. Devastating and immediate fires would be important in this case. Hand grenades might become more important in such situations than all electronics combined and independent (re)actions of all soldiers without much leadership would become most important.

Other patterns for dominant forms of infantry combat are imaginable and need to be considered. Every such form might lead to distinct preferences that could shape the ideal infantry small unit TO&E.

Another hugely important factor in 'real', wars of necessity (if not even total wars) is attrition.

Life expectancy drops to very, very sad levels once a man becomes an infantry lieutenant in wartime. It doesn't look substantially better for infantry NCOs.

A serious army needs to be prepared for appalling losses among its leadership. One way to prepare is to have more leaders than necessary (the U.S. way), another one is to overqualify their subordinates (the old German way).

As far as I can tell, the latter is superior because it enables a very quick adaption once losses happen. A decapitated platoon can continue its mission if an NCO takes the lead, while it would need to wait a while till a replacement leader arrives (and that guy would be unknown to the soldiers).

Some of the most effective and consequential small unit actions in military history have been completed by subordinates who took over command after the initial leaders fell.

This is quite a challenge for TO&Es, for you need enough well-suited men for leading, for employment of the main weapons AND as 2nd or 3rd in command. You don't want to rely on your best machine gunner as emergency platoon leader - that would equal a terrible loss of firepower. The 2nd in command should on the one hand not be too close to the 1st in command, but on the other hand you don't want him too far away. For example, he shouldn't be in the assault element if your army's tactic prefers the platoon leader to be with the fire support element.

Psychological capability in combat, the expected nature of infantry combat and attrition should influence our infantry small unit concepts much more than they seemingly did after the Cold War. Gadget-driven concepts of infantry combat and infantry small unit TO&Es have dominated for about 15 years and are still in fashion. This exaggeration needs to be corrected.

Again, it was impossible to cover the topic comprehensively. I limited myself to mention a few rather rarely discussed aspects of infantry small units setups. Maybe I ruined all the future fun of discussing gun calibres and 40mm underbarrel grenade weapons for you, but that's within the limits of the usual risks of reading this blog...

Sven Ortmann

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On defensive power

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People seek security in an uncertain, not exactly safe world. The consequences can be self-defeating.

One such example is an arms race. One state is a bit superior to his neighbour - the neighbour can't stand it and strives for superiority as well. Thus they spiral into an arms race, in worst case till they go beyond the sustainable strength. Inevitably one power realises that its strength isn't sustainable - but probably doesn't dare to accept inferiority. The result may be a war - the attempt to exploit a fleeting moment of unsustainable superiority that promises a better end than inferiority.

The situation in 1912-1914 and especially after the first mobilizations in 1914 was similar.

A theoretical way out is to build up military strength that's not of use in strategic offence. This way one power could be at strength "200" if defending itself and "100" if it's an aggressor - with a similar neighbour. Neither power would need to fear inferiority in war and no arms race would be necessary to feel safe.

Fortifications used to provide exactly this; military utility in strategic defence that's not directly useful for strategic offence. Permanent fortifications have lost their strategic utility, though. Even the fortifications along the Korean border don't come close.

Medieval fortresses are popular among tourists and generally capture the attention and imagination of people. These visitors don't reall understand how bad it really was when fortifications lost their strategic relevance.

Burg Hochosterwitz, photo: Johann Jaritz

There's a general problem on the tactical level that makes it difficult to buy exclusively "defensive" weapons (even anti-tank missiles have offensive uses!) for modern ground warfare: Operational defence neccessitates offensive actions on the tactical level. In fact, even stationary defensive concepts don't work without tactical counter-attacks.

Battlefield air defences are probably the only exclusively defensive combat component of ground forces and even they are of greater use during mobile (potentially offensive) operations than during static phases (= never offensive).

A competent operational defence with mobile forces is usually offensive on the tactical level, too: It's mostly about giving some ground in exchange for a good opportunity to counter-attack.

The power of mobile combined arms operations disqualifies the concept of "slow" (and therefore not much "offensive") ground forces such as infantry-centric forces. A total defence concept is not worth its budget if it cannot withstand a smaller and balanced offensive concept.

Finally, strategic defence is rarely exclusively defensive and successful at once. Successful examples that came close to total defence depended very much on geographic obstacles.

- - - - -

For clarification; defence is supposed to be the superior form of combat on the tactical level, but only with an at least similar degree of combat readiness. Real warfare tends to be tricky in this regard.

Defence is strong, but it's not decisive. History knows many example of two forces of about equal total strength clashing and the defensive one lost. This tragedy has hit many army commanders on the field of battle and modern European warfare had also several extremely impressive examples.

- - - - -

The only realm where a total defence concept seems to have the potential of success is the political level. The invention of defensive alliances (where members are not supposed to support an aggression of an ally) was ground-breaking.

The Cold War has taught us that this doesn't suffice to avert wasteful arms races. The problem was that NATO was perceived as one bloc by the Kremlin.

The Kremlin did indeed believe that all important NATO members would participate in a hypothetical aggression, even though they would not have been legally obliged to.

The post-Cold War NATO shows an even worse side-effect: Bored by the peace and relative lack of tensions among members, their attention became focused outward on minimal to ridiculously marginal problems. The defensive alliance became quite extrovert and asserted the right to keep the neighbourhood (not jsut its members) safe.

A focus on tactical to strategic defence was and is enticing for national security planners who want to make do with an affordable or even small budget. Sadly, there doesn't seem to be the right technology to make it work.

The good thing about all this is of course that we Europeans are productive enough to afford a degree of military superiority over our neighbours that discourages even the attempt of an arms race against us. This strategy for preserving peace and providing security does of course only work if your power/alliance can sustain a vastly greater military might.

Asia might not be able to rely on this concept. It might instead depend on geographical barriers (Himalaya, Pacific Ocean). The defensive alliance concept could help Asia as well - but they should avoid NATO's mistake and not appear too united. That is of course one of my rather "twisted" ideas and extremely unlikely to ever gain much ground among pundits ...

Finally, one more remark: The invention of "how to build a defensive army" - be it hardware, tactic or operational art - such an invention would be worthy of a Nobel Peace Prize and easily the greatest thing of the century.

Sven Ortmann

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The first week of a peer vs. peer air war; a dilemma

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It's been a classic dilemma of the Cold War: What should be done early on in an air war?

* Should the air forces focus on the air superiority fight (fighter vs. fighter) at first?

* Should they focus on the destruction of enemy air defences first?

* Maybe attack enemy airfields?

* Maybe blow up some important bridges?

* Attacks on hostile troops on road marches?

* Attacks on hostile troops in contact with friendly troops?

* Should squadrons relocate to more survivable airfields or stay at their home airbases?

* What kind of mix would be optimal?

The Israelis had this kind of dilemma - especially in the surprising Yom Kippur War 1973. They seem to have improvised. The substantial losses of their attack aircraft forced a campaign against hostile battlefield air defences on them in the midst of the conflict. In the end, lots of technological changes and special conditions prevent the Yom Kippur example from giving us reliable guidance about how to answer the dilemma.

The dilemma wasn't nearly as serious in the conflict against Iraq. The Iraq was simply no peer and not capable of immediate decisive action on the ground or air. Fighting against Iraqis was even less than a sparring match in comparison to WW3 expectations. Again, there's little to learn from the campaigns against Iraqi forces in regard to the basic prioritization dilemma.

- - - - -

There might be an answer to the dilemma, though: Surprisingly, this may be a technological answer (and we should be sceptical about it for this reason).

It's obvious that several of the aforementioned options are related to the survivability of combat aircraft. Survivability against hostile fighters, against hostile attack aircraft (when on the ground) and against hostile air defences.

Now what if we were able to take this out of the equation? Let's assume we had a silver bullet that can strike operational level targets (typically 50-500 km depth, for example) while the artillery can strike close targets (and substitute for lacking close air support).

The air forces would then be able to fight for air war superiority, fight air force vs. air force. They would have the best probability of success, could later turn on the hostile ground forces and deliver a strong argument for the politicians who hopefully keep negotiating about an end of the folly.

OK, which weapon or munition could render fighters, air defences and attacks on friendly airfields quite irrelevant? The (quasi-) ballistic missile!

Such missiles are very survivable against most air defence systems, have a useful range for the operational level of war (the longer the range the faster - and thus more survivable!) and nowadays such missiles have the necessary pinpoint accuracy for the destruction of stationary (fixed and reconnoitered semi-mobile) targets: Air fields, long-range air defence batteries, bridges).

NATO air forces (and navies) have understood their potential, their potency as threat - and accordingly spent a great deal of attention and money on hard kill defences against such missiles.

They did not embrace the (quasi-)ballistic missile themselves, though. Missile types with less than 500 km range would fit into the treaties that are in force (except possibly ICOC 3-3).

It may be a prejudice, but maybe it's simply bureaucratic inertia coupled with conservativeness and special interests (fighter pilot generals wanting more fighter wings, not more unsexy missile batteries) that keeps these missiles outside of NATO air forces.

Foreign policy strategy (promotion of ICOC & BM counter-proliferation efforts in general) might play a role as well.

The exposure to Third World ballistic missiles based on Russian 1950's technology has distorted the perception of the (quasi-)ballistic missile threat. Such missiles are at times interpreted as useful only with non-conventional warheads.

It's almost forgotten that NATO had such battlefield missiles with conventional warheads in service during the Cold War!

- - - - -

There are several modern designs of accurate (quasi-)ballistic missiles:

The U.S. ATACMS Block II missile:

supposedly 300 k range

The Russian Iskander missile:

supposedly 400 km range.

The Israeli LORA missile:

Supposedly 300 km range.

The payload is several hundred kilograms each - enough.

The most obvious choice for NATO forces would probably be to introduce (more) ATACMS Block II into Corps- or Division-level army artillery units and to produce in license a longer-range version of LORA (to be honest, its's most likely cheaper to let them develop a LORA 2 and to buy a license than to develop a missile of our own!).

The dilemma could then be solved quite easily; NATO air forces could alternate between defensive (defence with fighters and air defences) and offensive (additional strike packages against battlefield air defences and relatively easily accessible installations) phases until it has a won the air power vs. air power contest in one shape or another.

Strike missions against airfields, fixed and semi-mobile area air defence assets, bridges and the like (ministries?) would be substituted for with the fires from 300-500 km (quasi-)ballistic missile regiments.

Close air support could early on be substituted for with army aviation and artillery fires.

So far, the Western air forces don't seem to believe that this is necessary, though. They prefer air-launched cruise missiles of about 250-300 km range instead. Such cruise missiles require sorties just as the classic strike packages would do.

Maybe we should pay more attention to (quasi-)ballistic missiles as a gap in our air forces instead of paying obedient attention to other big ticket projects (fighters, bombers, air launched cruise missiles) and to the role of ballistic missiles as threats only.

F-35 and Typhoon critics are numerous - how many critical remarks about the lack of SRBMs in Western air forces did you see (except here)?

Sven Ortmann
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The 24/7 air attack paradox

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I could swear I wrote about this a long time ago, but I never find the article whenever I search for the post with my search function.

Well, here's it (again?), in short:

I see a problem in modern air/ground attack technology, and it takes a long look back to the prime time of air power to explain this.

The German army was almost completely unable to move in daylight on the Western Front from June 1944 till the end of WW2. Few exceptions proved the rule, and all of them were tied to poor weather phases.

The Western Allies achieved this with several thousand tactical aircraft that roamed the skies during daylight (very, very few were on non-strategic missions during the night). Every move in daylight even by small units was possible only along certain roads - especially roads that offered concealment (trees) in short intervals. The troops were then able to sprint into concealment once aircrafts were spotted. Even that was pointless if hostile aircraft were overhead all the time, of course.

The result was a huge problem on the tactical level, but it was an unmitigated disaster on the operational level. Reserves moved extremely slow and counter-attacks were much delayed. German operational art died the death of lags and slowness.

The critical component in this historical case was the Allies' inability to achieve a similar effect at night. There would have been no reason to restrict necessary marches to poor visibility phases if that had not offered effective concealment.

- - - - -

This is where I see a problem in today's air/ground attack avionics. We turned the night into day, supposedly because this was an improvement. The avionics and training costs for the night attack ability were quite high - were they worth it?

Our enemies would not be motivated to restrict themselves to night marches. They would be willing to march 24/7. The extremely valuable slowness and lag factors would not be in effect (at least not as much as back then). Instead, we could expend a limited quantity of expensive precision munitions against a much larger quantity of mobile targets.

Maybe that would suffice to compensate for the lack of the slowness & lag factors. I tend to believe that it would not if we really fought against a peer instead of against a 4th rate developing country military equipped with 'monkey model' hardware.

In short; I don't consider air/ground night attack capability as a desirable feature for a large share of NATO air/ground capable combat aircraft. It's also very questionable for attack helicopters, mostly for fratricide concerns.

The night air/ground capability looks like a prime candidate for luxury spending and gold-plating awards to me. It was very fashionable during the 80's and 90's and has become quite self-evident since then, but somehow I doubt that the operational consequences are really understood.

Sven Ortmann

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What is armoured reconnaissance good for?

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The Think Defence blog recently asked "What is a scout used for anyway?", in context of the recent UK decision to buy FRES Scout Vehicle (the UK is being ripped off with a modified ASCOD IFV project).

That's an excellent question.
Armoured recce doctrine varies a lot between countries, even within NATO.

There are roughly three categories of missions
for armoured recce units (above the level of battalion scouts):

(I) The undisputed armoured recce core missions
(II) Combat missions as auxiliary combat troops or at low force density
(III) "As you're already there..."

(Sequence is irrelevant.)

Category I
(The undisputed armoured recce core missions):

(a) Inform manoeuvre commanders about the situation out of the recce radius of his combat troops (& his own recce element).
This is the biggest chunk and gets the most attention. It's well-documented, therefore I don't delve into its details.

(b) Cooperate with air power and long range artillery (detection, tracking, identification, target designation, battle damage assessment).

(c) Probing in order to detect gaps or weak spots.


Category II
(Combat missions as auxiliary combat troops or at low force density):

(a) Defeat hostile recce elements when encountered (possibly hunt them down).

(b) Coups de main against establishing defensive positions, airfields, bridges, depots, combat (service) support troops, headquarters, SAM sites and radars.

(c) Flank security

(d) Advance guard / vanguard

(e) Deception (attacks) - this is especially an option if armoured recce vehicles look similar to the combat troops' vehicles.

(f) Rear guard action

(g) Convoy escort

(h) (Last ditch) reserve in crisis (in a defensive battle) together with engineers.

(i) Assault gun-like support of otherwise imbalanced (combined arms minus armour) efforts.

(j) Skirmishing combat force for fighting in & control of terrain in low force density (Americans call this an "economy of force" mission).

(k) Engage (with surprise effect) not battle-ready hostile combat troops.


Category III
("As you're already there..."):

(a) Report air situation far forward (passive ground/air sensors).

(b) Pick up air crews who crashed or ejected.

(c) Infiltrate/exfiltrate LRS teams and agents.

(d) Radio relay function

(e) Capture OPFOR equipment for technical analysis (especially rear unit's equipment).

(f) Disable infrastructure (rail lines, land lines, dams, civilian radio towers, bridges, tunnels, power lines, fuel stations).

(g) Emplace/retrieve unattended sensors.

(h) Destruction of crashed or emergency-landed aircraft (especially helicopters)

(i) Ambush hostile (hopefully unsuspecting) helicopters.

(j) Intercept hostile supply convoys.

(I certainly forgot several small missions.)

- - - - -

There's probably not a single army in the world that assigns all these missions officially to its armoured reconnaissance troops.

Such a complete set of missions and corresponding capabilities is nevertheless desirable, at least for a part of the armoured recce forces.

An armoured recce organisation that focuses on the employment of long-range sensors only would be enticed to restrict itself (if higher level commanders don't do it) to a kind of risk-averse forward (artillery) observer organisation. Fire support coordination teams and reconnaissance are different missions, though - the organisation, training and equipment should reflect this!

It's pointless to strive for risk-free scouting. Small scout teams are to be sent forward into traps in order to avoid that the whole formation walks into that trap.

- - - - -

An army review that looks into armoured recce should do something similar to this:

a) Get a reasonable idea about future conflict.
b) Establish mission requirements (pick missions from the list).
c) Address the organisation issue (especially the status; is armoured recce an army, corps, division and/or brigade asset?).
d) Think about adequate tactical principles.
e) Address the equipment issue (with budget in mind).
f) Write down the recommendations.

Sven Ortmann
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Defensive reconnaissance

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123. Für den Aufklärungsdienst sind nicht mehr Kräfte zu verwenden, als es der Zweck verlangt.

Die Aufklärungskräfte sind beizeiten in der wichtigsten Richtung zusammenzufassen, besonders wenn mit überlegenen feindlichen Aufklärungskräften zu rechnen ist. In Nebenrichtungen ist nur das Notwendigste einzusetzen.

Anzustreben ist, die Aufklärung je nach der Lage aus zurückgehaltenen Aufklärungskräften jederzeit zu verdichten, erweitern oder, wenn notwendig, auch in neuer Richtung ansetzen zu können.

("For the reconnaissance service are not more troops to be used than the purpose requires.

The reconnaissance troops shall be timely concentrated on the most important direction, especially if superior enemy reconnaisance forces are to be expected. Only the minimum (most necessary) shall be allocated for secondary directions.

It is to strive that the reconnaissance according to the situation be densified with held back reconnaissance forces at any time, expanded (enlarged, extended) or, if necessary, also to be sent into a new direction.")

This paragraph of the classic Truppenführung field manual (pre-WW2Wehrmacht) reminded me of an interesting detail; Wehrmacht reconnaissance theory/doctrine was offensive (= optimistic), just as most reconnaissance doctrines seem to be.

The pre-WW2 division of the German army generals into defensive, offensive and armour schools of thought had experienced a shift towards offensive during the 30's and towards armour after the fall of France. The defensive school had mostly assumed that front lines would quite reliably prevent penetrations and did not prepare reconnaissance guidance for the finding and tracking of fast enemy forces that had penetrated the front line (at least not behind the HKL, main line of resistance).

Other defensive skills were neglected as well till they had to be re-learned during the winter of 41/42. Delaying tactics, breaking contact and withdrawals were apparently not trained well-enough.

Back to defensive reconnaissance; Soviet tank units often peentrated the thin front line (often rather lines of pickets and hedgehog self-defence positions) quite often and they were very often particularly vulnerable because their escorting infantry (desants) experienced high losses during breakthrough fights.

The tanks were still able to wreak havoc among German rear units and had to be found, tracked, hunted and destroyed (preferably in ambushes).

That's where a huge problem intervened; there were no forces for the find & track part. Luck (radio reports from surviving rear units, for example) and improvisation had to suffice.

Late war tank destroyer, heavy tank and assault gun units organisations often had a cheap solution for this problem:

A platoon or more of light cars (Typ 82 Kübelwagen offroad-capable cars) with radio sets. These cars were survivable enough (by WW2 standards), quick, small, cheap, easily concealed, easily camouflaged, relatively silent and reliable.

They swarmed out, reported their findings and the anti-tank forces could move into advantageous positions for the AT fight.

I have yet to see an equivalent in modern field manuals; reconnaisance against enemy stragglers and incursions on supposedly friendly terrain doesn't seem to get much attention nowadays.

There are certain area recce, zone recce doctrines (rather patterns) in field manuals, but the idea that this could be used for purposes like the described one seems to be absent.

Unsurprisingly, much of the modern Western literature seems to assume that we'd be on the operational offensive in a military vs. military war. That's quite ahistorical (save for extremely one-sided conflicts such as OIF); a look at the culminating point of attack concept should suffice to remember us that periods of high activity (offence, defence) and relatively low activity (static defence) tend to alternate.

Sven Ortmann

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365 days - 195k pageviews

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The Flagcounter gadget was added on 21 June 2009, one year ago. It counted 195k pageviews*.

195k pageviews is a quite impressive figure in my opinion. The blog was almost entirely hidden from view before late 2008, after all.

Next step: Make it 195k a month. ;-)

- - - - -

German blogs are rare, German MilBlogs are even more rare and German blogs in English language are ... well, I know only two or three.

I'd love to see a few more blogs like mine in German, English or French. The MilBlog scene is too much dominated by American and French blogs in my opinion. They've got the language advantage (maybe there's a great MilBlog in Hungarian, but who could know about it?).

The British MilBlogs are often critique blogs with a strong focus on UK affairs. It's a bit strange why the UK bloggers don't cover stories from the whole Commonwealth. British TV and newspapers seem to have a raised interest in Commonwealth-wide affairs in comparison to foreign ones.

The American MilBlogs are often either too hardware-centric for my taste, or rabid and respectless right wing or a very few so-called "liberal" blogs. American MilBlogs in a wider sense do also include the more than 95% "I (or my husband) was in Iraq" MilBlogs.

- - - - -

It's not exactly an advantage in the modern German society to have a strong interest in military affairs - especially not so if you've already left the payroll of the Bundeswehr years ago. I do like to compare it to an interest in firefighting:

Nobody wants buildings to burn, everybody despises arsonists, yet you want a well-equipped, quick, effective and relatively safe firefighting reaction once a building is burning. Maybe I'm a pessimist, but I believe that even though most buildings are quite well-protected against fire, there are arsonists, buildings will burn, our firefighter department will be called. I do also believe that it's not going to be as good as it could be - it will even be worse than in earlier actions.

I blog with some interest in military affairs and civil liberties, and I do so with a conviction that Western armies are as ill-prepared for modern, full warfare as they were in 1913. Many people told me about their agreement with this view, and some were even more pessimistic.

Maybe I'm wrong and much more is fine than it seems to me - fine. Great. I'd love to be wrong on that one.

On the other hand - maybe I'm not that wrong. In that case, why not inspire some thinking with own thinking?

This is why I'd like to see more blogs like mine. I am cocky enough to assume that mine is an inspiration to some readers; that it raises the interest in different interpretations, in weak spots, in historical best practice examples. Many more blogs like that could probably have an advantageous combined effect.

Military theory is today being treated as a state secret in Germany (as if that secrecy had worked aginst the Reds). It wasn't always like that. Germany had a huge amount of published military theory discussions, articles and books prior to WWI. That activity wasn't enough to prevent the disasters of 1914-1918, but it had a very positive net effect nevertheless; a very competent officer corps. I'm not willing to say that the U.S. army officer corps is very competent (in comparison to other NATO officer corps), but they still have an open discussion culture on military theory. That was a bit restricted after 2001 when some branch journals (infantry, armor) were pulled from public view (as if that would enable secrecy...ridiculous).

Nevertheless, such a look beyond one's own nose can tell us that a more public military theory discussion in Germany would not equal treason. Our few military journals (to be found only in in the biggest press shops) do not need to be on the level of industrial propaganda, modeller and airsoft journals.

Sven Ortmann

P.S.: Statcounter counted 175k in the same period, now I want to see their CEOs in a boxing ring. ;-)
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Aviation - should it be a separate service or not?

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The question whether aviation should be exclusively in an air force, partially in navy/army or all in navy/army is a tricky one.

I reasoned that the supplier-customer relationship in the force structure is the key question for several years.

Aviation supports both naval and ground forces. The most obvious example is CAS (close air support); aircraft providing fire support to ground troops, not completely unlike artillery. Reconnaissance and logistical aviation are in similar support roles.

The USAF has the A-10 aircraft for CAS, and a long history of neglect (in comparison to its great affection with fighters and their pilots) has lead many in the U.S. Army to believe that the USAF prefers to be its own customer (air superiority, long-range attacks far away from battlefields) than to be a mere supplier for its customer, the Army. The USAF did indeed focus on CAS only during wars, while it invested heavily in more 'sexy' (prestigious) fighters (and in the 50's: nuclear bombers) than in CAS assets.

Part of the reaction was that the Army produced and emphasized a new aviation branch (after having lost the (United States Army) Air Force when that one became independent); helicopter army aviation and drone projects.

The relationship between infantry and artillery is similar; the infantry keeps its mortars as a hedge for the unreliable artillery that at times prefers to prepare for counter-artillery fires over hazardous close support fires.

- - - - -

The interpretation of the problem as a supplier-customer optimization problem has its difficulties, though. This point of view would assume that independent air forces neglect CAS and prefer so-called 'strategic' attacks while army-integrated air forces would be expected to focus on supporting the army.

The historical record trashes such a hypothesis. (That's too bad, for it was a really nice hypothesis.)

The independent German air force of 1935-1945 focused on 'operational' air support (supporting the operational plan of the army) and neglected so-called 'strategic' attacks (attacks on industry & cities) as much as was possible under the circumstances. This could be excused with several facts if it was the only exception tot he rule: The Luftwaffe was built by former army officers, influenced by WWI pilots who knew only air war over battlefields, had most enemy industrial centres well in range of medium bombers and resource constraints didn't allow for a 'strategic' bomber fleet anyway.

It wasn't the only exception, though: The Imperial Japanese Army Air Force had both CAS aircraft and long-range bombers (although the latter were also used in for some kind of 'strategic' interdiction and for missions in support of ground forces).

The U.S.A.A.F. (United States Army Air Force) was very much focused on 'strategic' bombing well into WW2 despite being part of the U.S.Army.

The independent WW2 Red Air Force of the Soviet Union (VVS,) did focus almost entirely on air attacks in divisional areas (very close to the front) as an independent air force. The Red Air Force had many long-ranged bombers in WW2 and used them almost entirely with a bomb overload (additional bombs, but minimal fuel) on very short range attacks. Its passing interest in long-range aviation was probably entirely dependent on the general Soviet Union's interest in long-range aircraft for civilian purposes.

- - - - -

Military history is less paradox in regard to the support of navies by independent air forces. The almost dismal naval performance of the Luftwaffe in WW2, the poor support of the Italian Navy by the Italian Air Force in WW2, the troubles of the late Italian Navy with equipping its Giuseppe Garibaldi aircraft carrier and the discouraging experience of the Royal Fleet Air Arm in the 30's all seem to confirm that navies need their own aviation branch or else there will be no good air-sea warfare capabilities.

(Hint: The German Navy lost its Tornado IDS wing to the Luftwaffe a few years ago. *Sigh*)

The Israel Air Force (IAF) may be a positive example. It did both the tactical/operational air support just fine in 1967 and 1973, was very capable in the rather 'strategic' Entebbe (1976)and Osirak (1981) raids and proved its 'operational' level capability again over the Beqaa valley (1982). Its later employments were rather mixed, in part because of inappropriate expectations.

Well, what's the optimum?

In regard to navies, the historical record seem to confirm that navies should have their own, unrestricted aviation arm.

A possible exception might apply to very maritime countries where an independent air force would not be distracted from air/sea warfare.

In regard to armies, the historical record seems to suggest a "It depends." answer. It depends on the national needs, on the circumstances and on the available technology.

A possible exception would apply to very small militaries. I doubt that it makes sense to separate air force and army in a military of less than about 100,000 total personnel. A separate air force in such a small military would likely be inefficient because of avoidable bureaucratic overhead.

Sven Ortmann

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